Justification and Psychology in Liberal Pluralism: A Reply to Zakaras George Crowder It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to respond to Alex Zakaras’s thoughtful and stimulating article. Although Zakaras takes my work (together with that of William Galston) as a critical target, much of what he says is common ground between us. That includes his basic understanding of value pluralism, his evident support for that idea, and his broadly liberal approach to politics. Moreover, I think that he makes a significant contri- bution by drawing attention to the relation between pluralism and fallibility, and by focusing on Isaiah Berlin’s treatment of Mill in that connection. Zakaras is right that Berlin’s essay on Mill has not until now been carefully examined as a resource for the debate about the way pluralism relates to lib- eralism, and his suggestions about what the essay may tell us in that regard are valuable. The central point of disagreement between us is apparently that while I believe that Berlinian pluralism provides a foundational justification for liberal politics, Zakaras seems to be saying that there is no such pluralist jus- tification for liberalism. Rather, pluralism and liberalism are more loosely connected in a “psychological” relation such that pluralists tend to be temper- amentally disposed to favor liberal values like toleration. Berlin’s essay on Mill is said by Zakaras to be useful in explaining that psychological link. I say that this “seems to be” the point of contention because it is not altogether clear that Zakaras either can or does avoid the issue of justification. If there is a psychological connection between pluralism and liberalism, or to the extent that there is one (since many pluralists do not appear to possess this psychology), is that a good thing or not? Zakaras clearly thinks that it is a good thing, but to explain why he needs more than a statement of psychologi- cal fact, he needs a justificatory argument. Actually, he does sketch such an argument toward the end of his paper. That argument turns out to be much the same as one of my own, which he purported to reject earlier in the paper. In the end, Zakaras seems to me to occupy a position much George Crowder is Professor, School of Social and Policy Studies, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia (George.Crowder@flinders. edu.au). The Review of Politics 75 (2013), 103–110. © University of Notre Dame doi:10.1017/S003467051200109X 103