Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001 Christopher Gelpi The Ohio State University Joseph M. Grieco Duke University Numerous prominent theories have relied on the concept of “audience costs” as a central causal mechanism in their arguments about international conflict, but scholars have had greater difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy and even the existence of such costs outside the bounds of game theory and the political psychology laboratory. We suggest that the audience costs argument focuses too narrowly on the likelihood that leaders will be removed from office by domestic constituencies for failing to make good on threats. Instead, we argue that scholars should ground these arguments on Alastair Smith’s (1998) broader concept of “competency costs.” Our analysis of presidential legislative success from 1953 to 2001 demonstrates the existence of foreign policy competency costs by showing that public disapproval of presidential handling of militarized interstate disputes has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president’s ability to move legislation on domestic issues through Congress. O ver the past two decades, numerous scholars have employed the concept of “audience costs,” introduced by Fearon (1994), in arguments re- garding the initiation, escalation, and resolution of in- ternational conflict. Yet scholars have had difficulty in identifying the operation of audience costs or even their existence outside the bounds of game theory and the po- litical psychology laboratory. In this article, we seek to move beyond the current audience costs perspective in two ways. First, we argue that scholars might profitably view punishments of lead- ers for making empty threats to be part of a broader set of sanctions by domestic groups based on their as- sessments of leadership competency. On an empirical level, we broaden the search for competency costs be- yond the removal of leaders from office, the traditional focus of analysis in audience costs studies, and instead focus on the impact of public perceptions of foreign policy competence on the ability of leaders to achieve Christopher Gelpi is Professor, The Ohio State University, 105a Mershon Center, 1501 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201 (gelpi.10@gmail.com). Joseph Grieco is Professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708 (grieco@duke.edu). The authors would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Seth Canty, Nathaniel Harris, Benjamin Radford, and Won Steinbach. Matthew Beckmann and David Rohde provided valuable guidance in the collection of Congressional voting data. In addition, the authors would like to thank Fulvio Attin` a, Daniela Irrera, Jude Hayes, and the participants at the University of Pittsburgh Symposium on Political Violence for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. domestic policy goals, in this instance the capacity of U.S. presidents to move domestic legislation through Congress. We find in an analysis of presidential legislative suc- cess from 1953 to 2001 that public disapproval of presi- dential handling of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president’s ability to persuade Congress to pass laws that move domestic policy in his or her preferred direction. However, successful handling of foreign policy crises does not generate a legislative “rally effect.” Instead, presidents who receive strong public approval for their handling of foreign policy crises are generally about as effective in get- ting laws on domestic matters through Congress as they would be if no militarized dispute existed at all. When presidents initiate or escalate a militarized dispute— and thus risk public disapproval of their handling of the crisis—they place the success of their domestic legisla- tive agenda at risk as well. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, No. 2, April 2015, Pp. 440–456 C  2014, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12169 440