NUCLEAR POWER, TECHNOLOGICAL AUTONOMY, AND THE STATE IN MEXICO Dimitris Stevis, Colorado State University Stephen P. Mumme, Colorado State University On 10 October 1988, President Miguel de la Madrid authorized loading of the first of two reactor units at the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, on the Mexican gulf coast above the port of Veracruz. De la Madrid's decision to move ahead with Laguna Verde, Mexico's first foray into commercial nuclear energy production, came as no surprise. What was extraordinary was that it proved to be one of the most controversial policy actions of his sexenio. Culminating twenty years of planning and develop- ment, the Laguna Verde project, which had been emblematic of Mexico's technical progress and promise at its outset, had turned into a political albatross. Mexico's decision to enter the nuclear power arena is a topic that lends itself to examining the debate over the capacity of upper-tier late- industrializing countries to sustain autonomous, technologically sophisti- cated development projects. This case is a useful one for several reasons: first, because the attainment of national autonomy in producing nuclear energy is considered beyond the reach of all but the most advanced industrial nations; second, because Mexico is often exemplified in the literature as an authoritarian regime managing advanced processes of dependent industrialization (O'Donnell 1978; Kaufman 1977); third, be- cause the project's long duration allows comparison of processes of policy development over several discrete administrations; and fourth, because the nature of the project-its policy complexity and role in the Mexican energy development-lends itself to examining the capacities and limita- tions of the Mexican state in this issue area. These features allow exploration of at least three interrelated ques- tions. The first aims simply at evaluating the Mexican government's policy performance in terms of its basic objectives. Were the nuclear policy in general and the Laguna Verde project in particular intended to promote Mexico's autonomy in energy and technology? If so, can the decision to operate the plant be justified in those terms today? The second question is, does Mexico's experience with nuclear energy support the hypothesis of structural limitations on late-indus- 55 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100023931 Published online by Cambridge University Press