18 october 2016 http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/PONARS-Eurasia/Russia-Understanders-in-Europe-Discourses-Communication-Consequenc-18430 Russia “Understanders” in Europe: Discourses, Communication, Consequenc Andrey Makarychev, Stefano Braghiroli Andrey Makarychev - visiting Professor, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies University of Tartu, Estonia Stefano Braghiroli is an ERMOS Post-Doctoral Researcher with CEURUS at the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Estonia. Resume The Ukraine conflict reinforced the desire of Kremlin policymakers to establish connections with a range of anti-status-quo groups in Europe. The Ukraine conflict reinforced the desire of Kremlin policymakers to establish connections with a range of anti-status-quo groups in Europe. Moscow’s broad aim is to catalyze support for and legitimize Russian sovereignty (and hegemony) and, perhaps, even the dissolution of the European Union project. The Kremlin has made ties with a variety of Russia sympathizers (“understanders”) in Europe a priority, and these groups and Moscow have found pragmatic use for each other’s platforms. Russian policymakers, however, seem to be aware that over-association with controversial European groups contains risks, particularly if Russian public perception views such connections as disagreeable. The Structure of Putin’s Support There are four groups of “Russia understanders” in Europe: The first group is a pragmatic one, with members mostly prevalent in Germany, France, Italy, Finland, and the Baltic states. Members of this group are connected to the economic and political interests of businesses looking for new opportunities in Russian markets. “Russia understanders” in Germany are especially keen to reproduce the ideological mantras of modernization theory, based on a particular interpretation of the end of the Cold War that considers the latter a result of Germany’s economic engagement with the Soviet Union. In the second group are those that have political identities largely based on ethnic and/or civilizational affinity with Russia. These are most prevalent in places like Latvia and Estonia, but also in pockets across Europe such as Bulgaria and Greece. The third group includes some leftist, neo-Marxist, and communist parties in Western Europe, such as the Left Party in Germany and Italian and French Communists. These see the struggle between Russia and the West as one of two competing hegemonies. They tend to favor insurgents in eastern Ukraine in their alleged struggle against “fascism.” The fourth group comprises far right parties such as the National Front in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Jobbik in Hungary, Ataka in Bulgaria, the National Democratic Party in Germany, the Northern League and Forza Nuova in Italy, the Freedom Party in Austria, Golden Dawn in Greece, and the British National Party. Their common denominator seems to be a strong appeal to the nation-state; they stand against supranational authorities they lambast for their alleged pro-U.S. stance and immigration-friendly policies. This last group is perhaps of greatest interest given the rise of social conservatism and nationalist agendas in both Russia and Europe today. Russia’s Discourses: Convenient Common Causes [1] Though it may sometimes seem the opposite, the Russian political mainstream is not strictly anti-European. In spite of many advocates for a Russian U-turn from Europe to Asia, Moscow does not seek to disrupt Russian connections with the EU but instead to open up the idea of Europe (“from Lisbon to Vladivostok”) to include contemporary Russia. As Russian political scholar Vasily Zharkov argued in early 2016 at the peak of Russia’s confrontation with Europe: “The Russian capital looks nothing like a besieged fortress….There is nothing to suggest a desire of Russians to turn away from Europe. On the contrary, Moscow has perhaps never looked as European as today….The existing conflict with the West can be explained as a natural continuation of the unceasing Europeanization of Russia. Moreover, it will result not in a turn away from the West but, most likely, an even closer coming together. A few months earlier, Russian political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky wrote of “Russia’s unbreakable bond with Europe”: “A…sizzling and demonically passionate bond. No European nation… could share or comprehend this passion. Russia does not just impose itself on the West. It is convinced that the West can and should be resolving its problems, live with them, and live with Russia too.…The new Russia did not want to defeat the West but to join it. In our dreams we had “already” joined, thanks to the dollarization of everyday life, politics, and economics....The long list of clear “evidence” made the West’s refusal to regard us as equals appear incomprehensible and malicious.”