DISCUSSION NOTE Ginsborg’s Reading of Wittgenstein on Rules and Normativity Gary Ebbs, Indiana University Abstract Hannah Ginsborg argues that according to Wittgenstein, a normal human subject can recognise that a new step is correct without grasping any rule with which the step accords. I argue, on the contrary, that according to Wittgenstein, a normal human subject’s understanding of a series and her capacity to take new steps to be correct continuations of the series are, as Wittgenstein says of “rule” and “accord” (PI §224), “related to one another.” Neither is more fundamental than the other. In her stimulating article “Wittgenstein on Going On,” 1 Hannah Gins- borg attributes the following theses to Wittgenstein: T1. A normal human subject can recognise that a new step is correct in a given context without consciously deriving that new step from a rule she grasps. T2. (a) There is a primitive notion of the correct next step in a context that is conceptually and explanatorily prior to and independent of any rule with which the step accords. (b) A normal human subject can recognise that a new step is correct in a given context in this primi- tive sense without grasping any rule with which the step must be in accord if it is to be correct. This discussion paper is a lightly revised version of comments I presented at the 2019 NYU Conference on Modern Philosophy, in response to Hanna Ginsborg’s presentation there of her paper “Rule-following without Rules: Wittgenstein on Normativity in Social Practice.” I thank Hanna for pointing out that one of my central textual criticisms needed clarification, and for suggesting to me that I reformulate and publish my NYU comments as criticisms of her paper “Wittgenstein on Going On” (Ginsborg 2020). 1. Ginsborg (2020). © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd DOI: 10.1111/phin.12334 Philosophical Investigations :  2021 ISSN 0190-0536