Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 46 • 2023 • 177–207 • doi: 10.2143/JIABS.46.0.3293162 DIFFERENT MOON SAME FINGER? TSONG-KHA-PA AND MI-PHAM’S APPLICATION OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S PRAMĀṆA THEORY FOR MEDITATING ON EMPTINESS JACOB FISHER ABSTRACT For the Mādhyamika, one may assume that the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the realisation of emptiness are a happy union. A clear and defend- able presentation of reality and the epistemic tools required for its realisation, it is often argued, will aid meditative training. This paper examines Tsongkhapa (Tsong-kha-pa, 1357–1419) and Mipham Gyatso’s (Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, 1846– 1912) use of Dharmakīrti’s pramāṇa theory for analytical meditation on emptiness. From their distinct readings of Madhyamaka, Mipham and Tsongkhapa do appear to disagree about the nature of emptiness. However, both follow Dhar- makīrti’s analytical and gradual approach to generating a pramāṇa realising ulti- mate truth, and the defining characteristics of pramāṇa in general, and specifi- cally yogic direct perception. This paper highlights that although these authors disagree about the nature of the ultimate in philosophical terms, they are surpris- ingly uniform in terms of their practical instructions on how to gradually realise it. Noteworthy is that both underscore the importance of unifying the realisations of emptiness and dependent arising through nearly indistinguishable analytical contemplations, and, at the point of meditative equipoise on emptiness (as long as the certainty has not waned) one no longer need conceptually affirm nor negate anything. As such, it is suggested that despite more surface-level distinc- tions, perhaps in the final analysis their views of emptiness are not all that different. KEYWORDS Mi-pham, Tsong-kha-pa, Madhyamaka, Dharmakīrti