DOI: 10.1007/s10108-003-0067-x Span. Econ. Rev. 5, 233–250 (2003) c  Springer-Verlag 2003 Price as a quality signal in a strategic competition context: The role of a disclosure law Miquel Carreras Sim´ o Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia. Avd. Lluis Santal´ o, s/n (Campus Montilivi) 17071 Girona, Spain (e-mail: miquel.carreras@udg.es) Abstract. This paper analyses a ﬁrm’s incentive to use price as a signal of quality in a duopoly competition, even though she can credibly and costlessly disclose her true quality. When a ﬁrm sets a higher price to signal higher quality, it has strategic