For Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variation, ed., Teresa Marques and Åsa Wikforss. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Final Draft May 29, 2019 1 How Not to Change the Subject Sally Haslanger 1. Introduction The project of conceptual engineering, conceptual ethics, or conceptual amelioration – I will assume for the purposes of this paper that they are all the same – is highly contested. Some have argued that conceptual engineering – or whatever we call it – is impossible, or possible only in a very restricted sense (Cappelen 2018); others embrace it enthusiastically (Burgess and Plunkett 2013). Debates over the possibility of conceptual engineering are confusing, however, because parties to the discussion start with very different accounts of concepts, meaning, content, and background philosophical methodology. There are also important differences in what those engaged in conceptual intervention see themselves as aiming for: Is the goal to introduce new (theoretical) vocabulary or revise the meaning of a (technical) term? Is the goal to promote a widespread linguistic change from the armchair? Is it an effort to change linguistic practices in the context of, and through the efforts of, a social movement? Recently, I’ve argued that there are two different ways in which we might think of amelioration on an externalist account of content (Haslanger forthcoming). One form of amelioration is epistemic, the other is semantic. Epistemic amelioration is important and fairly straightforward; but sometimes semantic amelioration seems to be needed. In this paper I will review the distinction between epistemic amelioration and semantic amelioration, and argue that at least one form of semantic amelioration – amelioration on functional grounds – is a coherent and sometimes valuable project. However, the point of conceptual amelioration as opposed to conceptual replacement is somewhat obscure. I shall suggest that the functional role of certain social concepts can sometimes warrant social critics in conceiving our project as amelioration rather than replacement. 2. Externalism about Content 1 In this section I will lay out the basics of an externalist account of (coarse-grained) content that will provide a backdrop for my arguments. I choose to proceed with these externalist assumptions, first, because I find the approach plausible; and second because I think it is a useful exercise to consider how amelioration might work within an externalist account of this sort. I am not the first to do this (see Cappelen 2018), but I hope to provide a different approach that allows us to be more hopeful about the possibility of amelioration. On the view of content I endorse, our utterances and our mental states do not have senses or concepts as their content (Stalnaker 1998). 2 We express, believe, suppose, (etc.) propositions, and propositions should 1 This section draws on Haslanger (forthcoming). 2 Many people have developed this view in different ways. I think there is enough of a shared background so that one need not be a thoroughgoing externalist to accept much of what I say here. I adopt a Stalnakerian framework, but there are other ways of making the same points. Thanks to David Plunkett for pointing this out. Note also that Yalcin and Pérez Carballo (2016) are expressivists about certain kinds of content. I don’t, here, mean to embrace their full views but am simply drawing on the passages I cite.