J. S. Asian Stud. 11 (02) 2023. 131-139 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.011.02.4286 131 Available Online at EScience Press Journal of South Asian Studies ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print) https://esciencepress.net/journals/JSAS Assessing the Ability of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy: To Maintain the Status-Quo in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans Gaurav Raja Dahal Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Kathmandu 00977, Nepal. *Corresponding Author Email ID: dahal@iuj.ac.jp INTRODUCTION The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy was Japan’s brainchild. In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for the first time, initiated the concept of a free and open Indo-pacific strategy to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, while addressing the parliament of India (Abe, 2007). In the speech, Abe also proposed for countries like India and Japan to form open and transparent Indo-Pacific maritime zones as part of the broader Asia. Soon after, in 2012, Prime Minster Abe published an article advocating the formation of a security relationship between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia to create what he called the “Democratic Security Diamond” (DSD)—a functional security framework in the Indo- Pacific (Abe, 2012). According to him, the main objective of DSD was to repel Chinese “coercion” from the region by improving maritime networks among the member countries in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. In a joint communique in 2015, Prime Minister Abe along with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi committed to establishing an open, stable, and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific (MOFA, 2015). Both leaders agreed to secure and develop the Indo-Pacific region following the principles of democracy, rule of law, sovereignty, and national integrity. BACKGROUND The FOIP strategy can be considered a huge undertaking for Japan. Japan, which usually takes a back seat to the United States in strategy formulation and implementation, drove the US into the concept. In fact, after Japan used the term Indo-Pacific, the United States adopted the name as well. The reason behind the adoption was that even though the United States had the strategy of the Asian Pivot, it was still focused on the middle east, especially Iraq and Afghanistan. As the hegemon’s competitors grow more powerful, their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ambitions, and demands for prestige and influence grow as well. (Schweller & Pu, 2011 p.42) China had also been seen challenging the rule-based international order that existed in the world through activities like building islands (Chellaney, 2018), and initiatives like the “Belt and Road” initiative (BRI) wherein “debt diplomacy” was wielded to try to influence these country’s affairs. With the increase of the Middle Kingdom’s power and growing A B S T R A C T China’s rising power and challenge to the status quo of the rules-based international order had led several nations, primarily Japan and the United States, to pursue a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy. However, such a strategy was predicated upon multilateral support. Was such a strategy viable? The research focuses on this fundamental question, applying various IR theories to the strategy. This paper hypothesizes that if multilateralism was successful, the FOIP strategy was viable. The significance of this research is that it may suggest necessary changes to the existing FOIP strategy or may validate its trajectory. Either way, the research provides both academic and policy significance. Keywords: Indo-Pacific, multilateralism, international order, middle powers, balancing theories.