Citation: Pezzano, G. The Medium Is the (Discriminatory) Message: The Medial Epistemic Injustices of Philosophy. Philosophies 2024, 9, 169. https://doi.org/10.3390/ philosophies9060169 Academic Editor: Soraj Hongladarom Received: 1 October 2024 Revised: 31 October 2024 Accepted: 1 November 2024 Published: 5 November 2024 Copyright: © 2024 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/). Article The Medium Is the (Discriminatory) Message: The Medial Epistemic Injustices of Philosophy Giacomo Pezzano Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences, University of Turin, 10124 Turin, Italy; giacomo.pezzano@unito.it Abstract: This paper brings the analysis of epistemic injustices and the perspective of media philoso- phy into dialogue by proposing the new concept of medial epistemic injustice. After introducing the topic, the contribution confronts some metaphilosophical stances in light of the recent medial turn in order to suggest that, despite all their controversies, philosophers seem to agree that doing philoso- phy uniquely involves writing texts. This discussion sets the stage for the claim that institutionally sanctioned philosophy manifests a mono-genreism that only admits one particular kind of written text and a mono-medialism that excludes all media other than writing. Next, the relationship between non-verbal media and philosophy is examined more closely on two levels. First, it is emphasized how academic philosophy leaves no room for corporeal thinking and visual thinking; second, it is illustrated how this may harm some individuals, using the example of deaf people and visually oriented autistic people. The conclusion proposes a provocative Gestalt-switch: What if current “angelic” philosophical knowledge were itself atypical, exhibiting the traits of an aphantasic mind? Keywords: medial turn; media philosophy; metaphilosophy; philosophical practice; writing; corporeal thinking; visual thinking; neurotypicality 1. Introduction: When Media Philosophy and Epistemic Injustice Meet Since its emergence [1] the concept of epistemic injustice has become highly influential in the ethical discourse, with its forms and applications becoming increasingly nuanced (e.g., [2]). We have seen the rise of not only a more canonical, extroflexive analysis, i.e., a philosophy on epistemic injustices, but also a more introspective self-analysis that takes seriously the fact that philosophy itself is an epistemic field that aims to denounce the epistemic injustices committed in and through philosophy itself. The aim of my paper is to contribute to this very enterprise of debunking and reconstruction by bringing the specific perspective of media philosophy into play: I will interpret and extend the concept of epistemic injustice in the light of the medial turn and then read and develop the latter in the light of the former. This—I suggest—can lead to a double gain: on the side of the analysis of epistemic injustice, we will be able to individuate a new and particular kind of exclusionary attitude and practice that has not yet received special attention; on the side of media philosophy, we will discover—keeping in mind the lessons of the intersectional-feminist approach to media studies (e.g., [3])—a new socio-ethical dimension as a complement to the cognitive and techno-material dimension that are usually at its core. My intention, then, is to broaden the understanding of the epistemic injustices perpe- trated specifically by philosophy. When we say that academic philosophy “lacks diversity with respect to...”, presents “substantial barriers to participation for...” or engenders “pre emptively denied opportunities to participate in an exchange...”[4], this critique also ap- plies to the types of kinds of intra- and extra-mental media and representations accepted as legitimate sources of philosophical knowledge. A kind of transcendental exclusion exists whereby dialectical spaces are not only gendered and racialized, but also mediatized—that is, some discourses are marginalized because of the media and representations they employ. Philosophies 2024, 9, 169. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9060169 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/philosophies