Book reviewslest_207 492..515 What Price Liberty? How Freedom was Won and is Being Lost, by ben wilson. London: Faber & Faber, 2009, x + 447 + (index) 13pp (£14.99 paperback). ISBN 978-0-571-23594-0. On a superficial reading Ben Wilson might appear to be engaging in deconstruction in What Price Freedom? For he draws a sharp contrast between ‘the principle of liberty’ and Leviathan-like governments whose members are only too ready to ‘sacrific[e] aspects of our heritage’ in order to deliver security and protection. In this contrast, we find just the sort of binary opposition on which deconstructionists dwell. A privileged set of values (protection and security) dominates the practical scene while counter- vailing concerns (liberty and the individual) languish on the sidelines. 1 Moreover, we might take Wilson’s emphasis on the importance of liberty as an argument for a deconstructive reversal: a switch in the order of priority in this binary opposition. 2 But to read Wilson in this way would be to do him a disservice. This is because he scrutinises a political heritage within which liberty (which he describes as ‘the supreme value’) and security each have an honourable place (since they are elements in a developing egalitarian governmental tradition). But while recognising this to be the case, Wilson argues that, in recent times, governments have acquired powers that make them a highly potent threat to liberty. He also pursues the theme that our understanding of liberty is no longer the ‘strenuous’ ideal argued for by John Milton (who associated it with freedom of thought and progress) and has turned to ‘mush’. 3 In light of these features of Wilson’s analysis we might see him as arguing for a rebalancing of the relationship between liberty and security. This seems to capture Wilson’s central aim. While this aim is worthy, Wilson makes the questionable assumption that its pursuit is a straightforward matter. This suggests a lack of sensi- tivity on his part to complexities in the politico-legal tradition he surveys. 4 To bring out some of these complexities, we will place emphasis on the political philosophy of Isaiah Berlin (in whose writings Wilson finds support for his analysis). However, we will also draw on a quintet of commentators (Michael Oakeshott, Cass Sunstein, John 1. JM Balkin ‘Deconstructive practice and legal theory’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ 743 at 746, et seq. 2. Ibid, at 747. 3. A binary opposition between ‘strenuous liberty’ and ‘bondage with ease’ shapes Milton’s thinking. See J Milton ‘Samson Agonistes’ in John Milton: The English Poems (London: Wordsworth Editions, 2004) L Lerner, intro (originally published in 1671) at 488 (lines 268– 271). 4. It seems apt to describe the tradition we are considering as politico-legal since those who have contributed to it have seen law as a means by which to pursue political goals and/or as an institution that places limits on the exercise of political power. Moreover, contributors to this tradition have expressed a wide range of views on the relationship between law and politics. However, contributions to this tradition share a common style (which is egalitarian in orienta- tion). On a ‘common style’ and ‘contrasts’ (or ‘unity in diversity’) as features of a tradition, see WH Greenleaf The British Political Tradition, Vol I, The Rise of Collectivism (London: Methuen, 1983) pp 9 and 12. Legal Studies, Vol. 31 No. 3, September 2011, pp. 492–515 DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-121X.2011.00207.x © 2011 The Authors. Legal Studies © 2011 The Society of Legal Scholars. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA