JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 15 PAGE: 1 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Wed Jun 17 15:59:43 2015 /first/juta/Juta/acta-juridica15/ch20 Equality beyond dignity: Multi-dimensional equality and Justice Langa’s judgments CATHERINE ALBERTYN* AND SANDRA FREDMAN † The tendency for South African equality jurisprudence to reduce equality to a single value, namely dignity, has been much debated, especially around the relationship of dignity to disadvantage. In this article we argue for a multi- dimensional idea of equality that moves beyond a dignity/disadvantage paradigm to enable a fuller exploration of the complex harms and injuries that underlie equality claims, and greater elucidation of the multiple principles and purposes of equality. In particular, we argue that substantive equality should be understood in terms of a four-dimensional framework, which aims at address- ing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; redressing socio-economic disadvantage; facilitating participation; and valuing and accommodating differ- ence through structural change. We suggest that this enables a better explora- tion of the different principles that underlie equality and an open discussion of complementarities and tensions between them. We explore the benefits of this approach through an evaluation of three equality cases in which Justice Langa delivered the leading judgments. Although we do not claim that he fully adopted such an approach, we engage Justice Langa’s philosophy on equality as it emerges from these judgments, and evaluate the extent to which we can develop from this a more fully-fledged understanding of equality and its underlying values in the South African Constitution. I INTRODUCTION In Brink v Kitshoff, the first equality case of the South African Constitu- tional Court, O’Regan J, writing for the court, identified the purpose of the constitutional right to equality as remedying patterns of disadvantage. 1 However, in a trio of cases that followed this, the court effectively placed dignity at the centre of the equality right, noting that its purpose was to accord equal dignity and equal human worth to all human beings, regardless of their membership of particular groups. This required that everyone be treated with equal concern and respect. This elevation of a largely undefined, and abstract notion of dignity as human worth, and the apparent displacement of other purposes, especially that of remedying * Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Attorney in the High Court of South Africa; BA LLB (Cape Town) MPhil PhD (Cantab). † Rhodes Professor of Laws of the British Commonwealth and the United States, Univer- sity of Oxford; BA (Witwatersrand) MA BCL (Oxon) FBA. 1 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC). 430