Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02612-4 S.I.: EXPLANATIONS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: UNIFICATION VS PLURALISM Appraisal of certain methodologies in cognitive science based on Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes Haydar O ˘ guz Erdin 1 Received: 7 November 2018 / Accepted: 26 February 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches (Eliasmith in Philos Psychol 9(4):441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped (Eliasmith 1996; van Leeuwen in Minds Mach 15:271–333, 2005). In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s (in: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research pro- grams (hereafter: “MSRP”). MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of con- tinuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s (Radical embodied cognitive science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2009) radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current method- ological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any method- ological considerations in cognitive science. Extended author information available on the last page of the article 123