1 Normality, as a Concept in Phenomenology This is a draft version, please cite the original (pages deviate) in: Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, edited by Nicolas de Warren, Ted Toadvine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47253-5_185-1 Maren Wehrle Erasmus School of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Synonyms: Abnormality; Anomality; Concordance; Optimality Definition Normality as a concept in phenomenology refers neither to a statistical or objectively measure average nor to what counts as normal within a specific time, culture, or society. Nor is it related to notions that equate normality with naturalness or natality. Normality, approached from a first- person perspective is characterized as a mode of experience, i.e., it is about what it is like to experience normally. Normality is comprised of two aspects, concordance and optimality. A normal course of experience must be concordant regarding prior experiences and optimal in relation to its contents, on the levels of individual and intersubjective experience. While normality as concordance is the condition of coherent experience, normality as optimality refers to the intentional aims of perception or action. Phenomenologically, normality is thus not an empirical, but a transcendental-philosophical, concept as it refers to the (general or genetic) conditions of experience. A minimal normality is regarded as necessary for every stable object-perception, smooth practical engagement with the environment, and the givenness of an intersubjectively shared world. The concept of normality in phenomenology is thus directly related to notions of objectivity (reality), and normativity. Concordance thereby represents the descriptive aspect of normality, while optimality introduces a normative dimension to normality. Lived and Represented Normality Normality, viewed phenomenologically, does not designate the statistical average but rather a mode of experience. Something appears in a normal way, i.e., as familiar, self-evident, expected, or even optimal. Experiencing normally has thus to be distinguished from understanding and evaluating something as normal. As soon as, and as long as, we experience normally, we are in no way explicitly conscious of something “as” normal, or of normality as such. Normal experience, that is, lived normality, thus only gets thematic in retrospect, that is, after a deviation from this normality has caused a (temporary or radical) break with a former normal experience. In Husserl, and later in Merleau-Ponty, normality is defined as a concordant and optimal way of perception and action. Normality, understood as a minimal form of coherence and optimality of experience, is thereby not only an additional quality or property of our experience, but a necessary condition for the stable experience of a world on different levels: Experiencing normally is necessary for (a) a stable object-perception (perception); (b) a smooth practical