Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon Methodological and Ideological Options How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea Hoon C. Shin a,b, ⁎ , David J. Yu c,d,e , Samuel Park c , John M. Anderies a,b,f , Joshua K. Abbott f , Marco A. Janssen b,f , T.K. Ahn g a School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA b Center for Behavior, Institutions, and the Environment, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA c Lyles School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA d Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA e Center for the Environment, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA f School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA g Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea ARTICLE INFO Keywords: Common-pool resources Design principles Voice option Resource mobility Group size Institutional fit ABSTRACT Two social feedbacks critical for redressing decline in organizational performance are exit (changing member- ship to a better performing organization) and voice (members' expression of discontent). In self-governing or- ganizations of common-pool resources (CPRs) experiencing decline from poor rule conformance, the exit option is often unavailable due to a closed membership policy. Thus, members should rely on the voice option to reverse the trend. However, it is poorly understood under what set of conditions members can successfully use the voice option to govern their CPRs. We analyzed 30 self-governing fishing groups in South Korea to generate config- urations of institutional and social-ecological conditions linked to the successful voice option. We considered Ostrom's Design Principles for rule enforcement as institutional conditions and resource mobility and group size as social-ecological factors affecting institutional fit. We find that if the informal mechanism for conflict re- solution is absent, fishing groups will be unsuccessful; even if rules for monitoring and graduated sanctions are not in use, groups can be successful when they harvest only stationary resources and the informal conflict- resolution is present; and groups managing mobile resources need graduated sanctions to be successful, while those appropriating only stationary resources can achieve the same outcome without such sanctions. 1. Introduction Common-pool resources (CPRs) are often held by an identifiable group of users who have traditionally self-governed the resources for their livelihoods. Under the communal property, self-governing orga- nizations have restricted membership on the basis of cultural affiliation, geographic location and residence, and the consent of existing members (Agrawal, 2002; Berkes et al., 1989; Bromley, 1990; McCay, 1980; Mosimane and Aribeb, 2008). The criteria for group membership (boundary rules sensu Ostrom) may contribute to the sustainability of CPRs by increasing the stability of group size and the predictability of members' behavior. But on the other hand, such a closed membership policy can make it difficult (if not impossible) for resource users to switch membership between organizations. The possibility of limiting individual mobility poses an interesting problem to CPR management because the availability of an option to choose a better performing organization has been recognized as a key mechanism that helps maintain and improve organizational performance (Hirschman, 1970). This option, referred to as the “exit option” by Hirschman, can provide a powerful feedback in competitive markets. Widespread use of the exit option by dissatisfied customers (i.e., choosing another firm's product) motivates firms to compete by improving their performance to address customer retention. However, such an exit-driven competition between organizations is not always available to self-governing groups for CPRs due to formal and informal entry barriers. Thus, an alternative feedback mechanism within organizations is further required for resource users to respond to decline in the effectiveness of CPR management. This study conducts a comparative analysis of an internally-driven https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106657 Received 21 August 2019; Received in revised form 16 February 2020; Accepted 16 March 2020 ⁎ Corresponding author at: School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA. E-mail address: hshin23@asu.edu (H.C. Shin). Ecological Economics 174 (2020) 106657 Available online 03 May 2020 0921-8009/ © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. T