Coping with Complexity and Organizational Interests in Natural Resource Management William Ascher Claremont McKenna College, 225 Bauer Center, Claremont, California 91711-6400, USA ABSTRACT To cope with the daunting challenges posed by system complexity while maximizing their organi- zational interests, resource management institu- tions must implement strategies aimed at reducing some of the particular dimensions of complexity. Virtually all of the recent initiatives to improve resource management— ecosystem management, adaptive management, stakeholder negotiation, disturbance prevention, multiple mandates for re- source management agencies, resource homogeni- zation, restoration ecology, the creation of pro- tected areas, the restoration of local-user rights, and algorithmic resource exploitation rules—are vul- nerable to inappropriate interest-driven simplifica- tions, many of which result from patterns of per- verse learning. A research agenda designed to identify better means of coping with complexity and the effects of organizational interests could help to improve resource and environmental manage- ment. Key words: natural–resource management; com- plexity; organization theory; policy failures; per- verse learning; ecosystem management; adaptive management. INTRODUCTION Natural resource management and conservation ef- forts are frequently hampered by perverse govern- ment policies. For example, resource managers who try to maintain diversity in land use often run into regulations—sometimes adopted under the banner of “ecosystem management”—that impose central- ized, uniform land-use rules. Government agencies specifically entrusted with balancing resource ex- ploitation and conservation often give short shrift to conservation. Strong conservationist and environ- mental regulations are frequently enacted with great fanfare only to go unenforced. Occasionally, ecosystems are dismantled in the name of conser- vation—for example, the notorious Costa Rican re- forestation scheme that rewarded landowners for ripping out natural forest so that it could be re- placed by exotic species, or the fire suppression doctrine of the US Forest Service that for decades left public forests vulnerable to disease and devas- tating forest fires. “Stakeholder consultation,” de- signed to foster community-supported conserva- tion, sometimes deteriorates into governmental manipulation or culminates in a stalemate when anticonservationist groups end up with veto power. It is tempting to chalk up these perverse policies to politics, incompetence, or the ill will of govern- ment officials. Yet leaving the explanation at this level denies us the opportunity to seek ways to improve resource and environmental management. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the deeper reasons why perverse policies arise and persist. To address this problem, we need to examine how and why government agencies fail to develop or implement optimal resource policies. The pre- scriptive model that legitimizes the active role of government in resource and environmental man- agement depends on the fundamental premise that Received 4 October 2000; accepted 15 June 2001. *Corresponding author; e-mail: william.ascher@claremontmckenna.edu Ecosystems (2001) 4: 742–757 DOI: 10.1007/s10021-001-0043-y ECOSYSTEMS © 2001 Springer-Verlag 742