‘Ethics of the Other’ with and without Proper Names in Levinas Emmanuel Levinas (1905- 1995) is generally known as a critic of phenomenology who argued in favor of 'ethics of the other' rather than 'ontology' as the first philosophy. This means that ethical "responsibility" is rooted in our encounter with the independent and irreducible "other" within ourselves, other human beings, things, and the world. As a result, we feel unique, infinite responsibility towards all of them—ethics is not limited to Self and human beings. During the 1970s (as in our time) when the world and local wars, terrorism, nuclear weapons, and the like problems were widespread, our French philosopher highlights that proper understanding of ourselves arises from an encounter and 'relation' with the Other that has unerasable 'difference' with Self and cannot be 'subjected' and 'totalized' within and by the Self. The mentioned ethical 'relation' of the Self or Same with the Other is not static, 'nondirectional', and 'dissymmetrical', but such a condition awakens the Self's ethical responsibility. This theme is encapsulated in Levinas's concept of humans with and without proper names, who can resist the erosion of meaning and facilitate genuine communication. In the meantime, the focal point in Levinas's ethics of the other is the distinction between "le dit" (the said) and "le dire" (the saying). "Le dit" refers to the content or meaning of what is communicated, while "le dire" refers to the act of communication itself, the openness and vulnerability in addressing the Other. Levinas argues that true communication, and indeed true ethics, begins with "le dire," the saying as an alive action of the other, where we are open to the Other's otherness, rather than simply focusing on "le dit," the fixed and determinate content of ours as Self or same.