1 Caesar’s War in Spain The Campaign to Ilerda in 49 BC (Bellum Civile, 1-2) Abstract ... validissimas Pompei copias, quae sub tribus legatis M. Petreio et L. Afranio et M. Varrone in Hispania erant, invasit, professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce et inde reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu. Et quamquam obsidione Massiliae, quae sibi in itinere portas clauserat, summaque frumentariae rei penuria retardante brevi tamen omnia subegit. ... (Caesar) attacked the most powerful forces of Pompey, which were in Spain under the command of the three legates M. Petreius, L. Afranius and M. Varro, and he said to his friends beforehand that he was going to fight an army without a leader and from there would return to fight a general without an army. Although he was delayed by the siege of Massilia, which had closed its gates to him while he was on the march, and being extremely short of supplies, yet, in a short time, he was successful against all his enemies. (Suetonius, Julius Caesar, 34.2) The focus of this discussion, a revised version of one first published in 2015 (see Bibliography), is the campaign undertaken by Caesar following his successful occupation of Rome and Italy in the first half of 49. The military activity was mostly located in what is today Catalonia, but in the Roman Empire of the first century BC was in the province of Hispania Citerior the main city of which was Tarraco (Tarragona). The battlefield was outside the town of Ilerda (modern Lerida/Lleida) about 100 kilometres (60 miles) inland from the coast in the foothills of the Pyrenees mountain range, and on the route to one of the passes that linked this northern part of the Iberian Peninsula with the Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis. This paper aims to illustrate that, a campaign of little interest to modern scholarship, was actually of great importance for the evidence Caesar, as author, himself sheds on military logistics in the Late Roman Republic. Introduction 1 In 49 BC Caesar intended to neutralise or annihilate all opposition to his rule in the western sector of the Roman Empire in order that he could not be attacked from especially Spain where his rival Pompey had legions commanded by legates loyal to him. The campaign was rather brief, lasting barely two months, with Caesar gaining outright victory in all quarters of the conflict, and as a result, it has evoked little interest in comparison to the more famous episodes that culminated in the battle of Pharsalus in the following year. Nonetheless, the conflict in southern Gaul and northern Iberia is of considerable interest for it is the magnitude of the logistical problems and how these were overcome which show them to have been instrumental in securing Caesar’s primacy there and eventually in Rome. Of particular significance is the speed by which Caesar acted and how all aspects of military capability were galvanised into making this such an overwhelming victory for its architect. The main source for this conflict is not only primary, in the most precise definition of the term, in that it is contemporary, but also it is a personal account in that the protagonist has provided a narrative that he wrote himself. Primary source evidence that is also autobiographical poses its own unique problems for the historian since it is likely to possess bias to a greater or lesser extent, and so inevitably it has to be dealt with care and on occasion some scepticism. The secondary ancient literary evidence for this campaign which involved the siege of Massilia and the events leading up to the battle of Ilerda is also problematic since where it exists at all it consists of an adaptation of Caesar’s own account. 1 For the relevant maps and plates, see Evans (2015) xix-xxii, Nos. 22-30, between 98-99.