37 Natalia Scavuzzo: Interpreting Interpretative Errors Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 62, 1/2025, str. 37-52 Natalia Scavuzzo, PhD * INTERPRETING INTERPRETATIVE ERRORS UDK / UDC: 340.11 340.12 DOI: 10.31141/zrpfs.2025.62.155.37 Izvorni znanstveni rad / Original scientific paper Primljeno / Received: 13.1.2025. This article examines the attribution of interpretative errors in judicial decision-making, a recurring yet under-theorised element of legal practice. It highlights how ideologies of legal interpretation and legal decision-making shape the criteria for evaluating interpretative correctness and critiques traditional dichotomies between axiological and epistemic errors. Proposing an integrated approach that merges decision-making and cognition, the study underscores the ideological commitments inherent in interpretative activities and their implications for the principle of legality and judicial accountability. In this light, it explores the dual function of error ascriptions: maintaining interpretative normalcy and driving change within judicial practices. Key words: legal interpretation, ideology, legality, epistemic error, axiological error. 1. INTRODUCTORY SYNOPSIS This article delves into the ascriptions of interpretative errors in judicial decision- making which is a common feature of legal practice. While the attribution of errors to interpretations is persistent in judicial practices, theoretical discussions often fail to clearly define its functions. The analysis begins by defining interpretation as a core activity for the justification of judicial decisions, emphasising its practical importance and its theoretical relevance for reconstructing judicial reasoning from logical and semantic perspectives. This study examines how ideologies of legal interpretation and legal decision- making shape the attribution of interpretative errors, arguing that these ideologies significantly determine the evaluation of correctness. It criticises traditional theoretical approaches, cognitive, sceptic, and eclectic, that rely on a dichotomy between axiological and epistemic errors. An alternative approach is proposed, integrating decision and cognition to better explain interpretative practices. According to this view, the dual function of attributions of interpretative error emerges as mechanisms for both controlling interpretative normalcy and fostering changes in judicial practice. In light of this, it distinguishes between “errors in the practice,” arising from internal evaluations of adequacy within existing norms, and “errors Natalia Scavuzzo Interpreting Interpretative Errors * Post-doctoral researcher. Università di Bologna. scavuzzonatalia@gmail.com ORCID 0000-0002- 8009-7468.