STATE ORGANON F 14 (2007), No. 2, 143 − 147 Copyright © Filozofický ústav SAV, Bratislava A NOTE ON THEOLOGICAL FATALISM 1 Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘‘ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope- fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist. KEYWORDS: God, can or could have been, cannot, counterfactual, . I The orthodox theist who worries about the compatibility of God’s in- fallibility with human freedom is faced with a serious problem. For if the existence of an omniscient and infallible being precludes human free- dom it then precludes divine freedom as well. In which case a divine be- ing cannot be omniscient, infallible as well as omnipotent. We shall present what we take to be the strongest argument for theo- logical fatalism and show that while the argument is valid it misses its intended target. By missing its intended target the argument illustrates a surprising anomaly in the standard formalization of ‘cannot’. The argument for theological fatalism that worries the orthodox piv- ots on the “cannot” that on his view divine infallibility implies. 2 He ar- 1 This paper includes and extends my paper (2005). The original paper (section I) is here included with the kind permission of Ashgate Publishers Ltd. (www.ashgate.com). A version of the whole paper was read at Charles University in Prague. I’m deeply grateful for the hospitality of my hosts and for their comments. The trip would have never come about but for Dr Juraj Hvorecky. I thank Professor Vojtech Kolman for his invitation and for providing the forum for the lecture. I thank him as well for having assigned his gifted student Martin Fontan to be our guide. A version of section I was read at the University of Miami. I thank Harvey Siegel for inviting me and for the sharp criticisms that I received from him and his colleague Ed Erwin and from my colleague David Widerker. My deepest debt however is to Mi- chael Clark for the numerous exchanges which led me to see what I was really after.