1 Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence Ryan Wasserman Western Washington University Suppose that a certain individual—Jones—has just sat down at t, and that an essentially omniscient being—God—existed a thousand years ago. Given that it was true a thousand years ago that Jones would sit at t, it follows that God believed a thousand years ago that Jones would sit at t. 1 Moreover, given that this was the case long before Jones was ever born, it seems as if he had no choice in the matter. 2 That is: (1) Jones had no choice about whether or not God believed a thou- sand years ago that Jones would sit at t. Moreover, given that God is essentially omniscient, the fact that he believes a proposition entails its truth. So: (2) It is necessarily the case that, if God believed a thousand years ago that Jones would sit at t, then Jones would sit at t. Finally, it is plausible to think that, for any subject, S, and any propositions, p and q, if S has no choice about whether or not p, and p entails q, then S has no choice about whether or not q. 3 Given this “transfer” principle, it would follow that: (3) Jones had no choice about whether or not Jones would sit at t. 1 It also follows that God knew a thousand years ago that Jones would sit at t, but there are good reasons for putting things in terms of belief, rather than knowledge. See section 3. 2 Fischer (1994: 78-85). 3 Fischer (1994: 23-66).