Replies to Barrett, Corris and Chemero, and Hutto Shaun Gallagher 1,2 Ó Springer Nature B.V. 2019 Abstract In this essay, I respond to the critical remarks of Louise Barrett, Amanda Corris and Anthony Chemero, and Daniel Hutto on my book Enactivist Interven- tions. In doing so, I consider whether behaviorism can make a contribution to enactivist theory, whether synergies are the same as dynamical gestalts, and whether the brain can add anything to mathematical reasoning. Keywords Enactivism Á Behaviorism Á Synergy Á Mathematical reasoning 1 Enactivism and behavioral science In Enactivist Interventions I suggest that it might be better to consider enactivism a philosophy of nature rather than a scientific research program. Barrett follows up on this point by suggesting that enactivism challenges a number of scientific assumptions. Specifically she highlights what we might call a nuanced epiphenom- enalist assumption with respect to human agency in evolutionary psychology. Agency seems to have a zero status lodged between the mechanisms of biology and the forces of culture. To the extent that, as I suggest, enactivism champions an agent’s pragmatic problem-solving know-how Barrett views it as supportive of a conception of human agency that is in dynamical dialectic with biological and Let me first thank Louise Barrett, Amanda Corris and Anthony Chemero, and Daniel Hutto for their close readings of Enactivist Interventions and their insightful comments. I’ll respond to each in turn. I’ll start with the broadest concerns, voiced by Barrett, and follow up by addressing the more specific issues identified by Corris and Chemero, and Hutto. & Shaun Gallagher s.gallagher@memphis.edu 1 Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, USA 2 Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia 123 Philos Stud https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-01234-4