RIFL (2012) 5: 22-37 (Azione, percezione e linguaggio) DOI 10.4396/20120303 __________________________________________________________________________________ 22 Words are not just words: the social acquisition of abstract words Anna M. Borghi Department of Psychology, University of Bologna anna.borghi@gmail.com Felice Cimatti Department of Philosophy, University of Calabria felice.cimatti@gmail.com Abstract Language is usually considered as a set of arbitrary symbols that convey subjacent internal concepts. According to this traditional approach words are only words, mere external signals of internal processes. In contrast, we propose that Words are social Tools (WAT). This view allows us address one of the critical problems embodied views face, the problem of how abstract words are acquired and represented. Indeed, we argue that the role of sensorimotor engagement varies depending on the considered domain. In the case of the acquisition of concrete word meanings, categories are grounded primarily in perception and action systems, and linguistic labels contribute in constraining the boundaries of grounded categories. In the use of abstract words, the opposite mechanism might be adopted. Abstract words are more difficult to learn because they activate a much more complex set of situations, objects, human activities and so on. The linguistic labels help us group and assemble this variety of experiences. In addition, diversity of languages has more of an impact on abstract words as opposed to concrete word meaning. Keywords: embodied cognition; language comprehension; social cognition; abstract words; extended cognition 1. Introduction We are accustomed to consider words and sentences as simply words, i.e. as a medium with which we refer to objects, actions or to internal concepts. In this paper we argue that words are not mere signals of something, they are not empty boxes whose only function is to be filled up by an external or internal content (objects or concepts). Rather, using words and sentences is a kind of experience (AUSTIN 1962); in addition, language is a social fact (for a similar view, see HALLIDAY 1978). This is the core claim of our WAT (Words as Tools) proposal. Following Wittgenstein, we conceive words of a language as a set of tools that allow the user to perform a given activity: «think of the tools in a tool-box: there might be a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects... Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or when we meet them in script and print.» (Philosophical Investigations, I, § 11). We argue that conceiving words as tools can help us solve the problems posed by the meaning of so called abstract words, such as “freedom”.