For Philosophical Issues. IN DEFENCE OF THE NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF IGNORANCE DUNCAN PRITCHARD University of California, Irvine dhpritch@uci.edu ORCID: 0000-0002-5997-0752 ABSTRACT. In his recent monograph¾Ignorance: A Philosophical Study, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023)¾Rik Peels offers a critique of the normative account of ignorance that I have developed and defended. I hereby respond to that critique. I argue that Peels’ response, even by its own lights, in fact concedes far more to the idea that there is a normative condition on ignorance than he realises. Indeed, I conclude that Peels would be wise to embrace the normative condition on ignorance that I propose and try to incorporate it into his own theory of ignorance. KEYWORDS: Epistemology; Ignorance; Intellectual Vice; Knowledge; Normative Account of Ignorance. DECLARATION: The author confirms that they have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.