Office of Immigration Statistics POLICY DIRECTORATE An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling Costs along the Southwest Border BRYAN ROBERTS, GORDON HANSON, DEREKH CORNWELL, AND SCOTT BORGER* I. Border Enforcement and Smuggling Costs on the Southwest U.S. Border Border enforcement is intended to prevent and deter the illegal movement of goods and people across a country’s border. The intensification of border enforcement activities creates impediments to illegal entry that increase the costs incurred by migrants when crossing the border. Increased costs may include additional time investment, physical hardship, and higher fees charged by smugglers who assist migrants across the border. The impact of enforcement on illegal immigration depends on how enforcement affects migration costs and how migration costs affect the decision to migrate. Our goal in this paper is to estimate the impact that enforcement has on the price smugglers charge to bring illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border. The degree to which migration costs rise in response to intensified enforcement can be termed the cost elasticity with respect to enforcement, and the degree to which the number of potential illegal immigrants falls in response to increased costs can be termed the migration elasticity with respect to cost. One important aspect of migration costs that can be quantified and measured is the fee charged by smugglers of illegal immigrants. Intensified enforcement activities should increase the difficulty and cost to a smuggler for getting clients successfully across the border, and this would be passed on to clients through an increase in the smuggling cost. 1 It is probable that an increased smuggling cost would deter potential illegal immigration, thus creating a level of deterrence. 2 The degree to which border enforcement activities have prevented and deterred the movement of illegal immigrants across the Southwest border of the United States is an issue of public policy importance and has been the subject of considerable debate. It is also a challenging measurement issue with respect to both data availability and statistical methodology. In this study, we estimate the value of the smuggling cost elasticity with respect to enforcement on the Southwest border of the United States using data on the price charged by smugglers to assist illegal immigration, as collected by the United States Border Patrol (USBP) from individuals apprehended at the border, and the level of enforcement activity, 1 Spener (2001) lists the key reasons for why more intensive enforcement should lead to higher smuggling cost (p.148). 2 Interior enforcement activities also affect the economic return to illegal immigration and might indirectly influence the smuggling cost charged to cross the border. A full estimate of the elasticity of cost with respect to enforcement, and migration with respect to cost, would take into account all relevant enforcement activities. We focus here only on enforcement at the border in order to make the analysis manageable. Extension of this analysis to take into account interior enforcement, and illegal crossing at ports of entry, are tasks for future research. *Bryan Roberts: Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Department of Homeland Security. Gordon Hanson: University of California-San Diego and NBER. Derekh Cornwell: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Scott Borger: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. The authors gratefully acknowledge the outstanding research assistance of James Lee and Daniel Martin of the Office of Immigration Statistics. The analysis, terminology, and conclusions presented in this study do not necessarily reflect those of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP).