disadvantage to India. Pakistani leaders have had to devote a great deal of energy simply to ensuring that that their country could survive, particularly during its early years. This acute sense of insecurity goes a long way toward explaining why Pakistan became a praetorian state. Second, the field of international relations often privileges security-based explanations for con- flict, characterizing states as status quo security seekers motivated primarily by a desire for survival rather than by ideational or philosophical preferences. As Ganguly points out in this book, however, security-centric explanations do not always accurately capture reality. States may not have status quo preferences and insecurity may not explain their violent behavior. Rather, states may be “greedy,” seeking goals unrelated to security, such as honor, wealth, or outcomes based on normative or religious preferences. In these cases, efforts to encourage less disruptive behavior by assuaging states’ security concerns may be ineffective, and even counterproductive, failing to address aggressors’ true motives and potentially emboldening them further. This delineation between security-seeking and greedy states is not new. For example, Charles Glaser discussed it at length from a theoretical perspective, and Christine Fair drew heavily on it in her recent study of the Pakistan Army. Ganguly’s contribution lies in his ability to show how greedy preferences have driven revi- sionist Pakistani behavior and affected Indo-Pakistani relations during the critical period in the two countries’ history since the turn of the twenty-first century. The book brims with historical detail—so much so that empirical richness can at times threaten to obscure the theoretical argument. Nonetheless, Ganguly is generally able to maintain a balance between the two and keep his larger point in focus. The implications of his analysis are sobering. Even the most enlightened efforts to discourage Pakistani revisionism and improve the Indo-Pakistani security dynamic are unlikely to succeed unless Pakistan abandons its greedy preferences. Given that Pakistan has held these prefer- ences for the nearly 70 years since its founding, there is little reason to expect that this will occur any time soon. PAUL KAPUR Naval Postgraduate School Escaping Jurassic Government: How to Recover America’s Lost Commitment to Competence by Donald F. Kettl. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2016. 200 pp. Paper, $25.00. My reaction upon reading the first few pages of this book was disgust. I had to suppress a strong desire to hurl it across the room. Wait, citizens, hear me out! My disgust has nothing to do with Donald Kettl’s excellent book. It has everything to do with the failure of our discipline even to entertain a full 562 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/psq/article/132/3/562/6847441 by guest on 13 January 2023