ORIENT IV / 2010 33 Sophie Roche and Aksana Ismailbekova Demography and Patronage. The Dynamics of the Youth Bulge in Kyrgyzstan 1 I. Introduction 2 “We youth feel responsible for the over- throw of Bakiyev’s corrupt regime. We were in the square dying, but now the question is how will the government improve the youth situation, and to whom to delegate power.” Meerim Shamyrkanova (Bennett 2010 3 ) In the past years, political events in the post-so- cialist republic Kyrgyzstan have made it the focus of attention on several occasions. Revolutions, un- rest and ethnic conflicts are just some key words that were used to describe the various events. Journalists and increasingly also social scientists have worked to provide a better understanding of how and why such events were possible in Kyr- gyzstan, the country that at the eve of independ- ence was perceived as the democratic island in Central Asia (Anderson 1999 4 ). The focus was placed on political elites, on political processes and economic problems. Patronage was taken as a lit- tle-questioned, self-explanatory central links. By linking patronage to youth we wish to contribute to the debate another aspect that so far has been rather ignored: the role of youth. The development in Kyrgyzstan reflects the com- petition for power and influence and for ideologies and political systems. But it also reflects a creative and dynamic way to adapt globally circulating con- cepts of democracy and youth to local realities and culturally shaped ways of conducting disputes. Be- sides the political discussion, we may also believe that a youth bulge lies at the heart of recent socio- political dynamics. A youth bulge can be identified in those countries that are in a demographic tran- sition from high fertility to low fertility and is related to an increased risk of violent conflicts (Kröhnert 5 , Urdal 2004, 2006, 2007 6 , Roche 2009 7 ), but has also been identified as the motor of socio-political changes. For instance, Dhillon and Yousef (2007 8 ) suggest that a proportionally large number of young people leads to an economic phenomenon in which young people accumulate wealth more easily because the number of dependent people (elders and children) diminishes (sinking depend- ency ratios). Gunnar Heinsohn (2006 9 ), by contrast, claims that having a high percentage of young people was at the base of colonial expansion and Fuller (2003 10 ) and Huntington (1996 11 ) go even further by claim- ing that a youth bulge in Islamic societies is a tick- ing time bomb. Although these studies have contributed valuable material to conflict theory and have drawn our attention to the demographic po- tential of young people, they fail to address how youth as a category or demographic cohort turn into active young people. In writing about youth, we would like to link the youth concept with patronage as two interrelated phenomena. However, instead of focusing on youth as an independent social group, we suggest 1 This article is based on the experiences of Sophie Roche and Aksana Ismailbekova, who have worked in Central Asia for more than eight years. Whereas Roche finished her thesis about the youth bulge and conflict in Tajikistan and now works on religious fundamentalism among young Tajiks (Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin), Ismailbekova has intensively worked on patronage systems in Kyrgyzstan (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale)). Both authors have carefully followed events in Kyrgyzstan and supplemented their information with available material. 2 We would like to thank Maria Louw and Jeanne Féaux de la Croix for their critical engagement and valuable com- ments on earlier versions. 3 Bennett, D. 2010. Kyrgyz youth activists struggle to find place in Bishkek’s new order. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61137 (accessed 24 May 2010). 4 Anderson, J. 1999. Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia’s island of democracy? Amsterdam: Harwood Acad. Publ., pp. 23. 5 Kroehnert, S. (unknown). Jugend und Kriegsgefahr. http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Kroehnert Jugend_und_Kriegsgefahr.pdf (accessed 14 November 2008). 6 Urdal, H. 2004. The devil in the demographics. The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950-2000. In: Social Development Papers. Washington, DC: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank. Urdal, H. 2006. A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. 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