Introduction In the „recognition-theoretical‟ philosophical tradition it has been thought that intersubjective recognition (Anerkennung) is a central factor distinguishing humans from other animals. (Hegel 1977, Honneth 2008, Schmidt am Bush & Zurn (eds.) 2010, Stekeler (forthcoming), Ikäheimo & Laitinen (eds.) forthcoming) Michael Tomasello has proposed that a major factor distinguishing the normal developmental path of human infants from their closest relatives is the practice of pre- linguistic communicative pointing. Human infants engage in it from around their first birthday, whereas apes never seem to engage in full-fledged communicative pointing. I suggest focusing on attitudes of intersubjective recognition as a candidate for a key motivational difference between humans and non-humans, and thereby as part of the explanation for why humans engage in practices of communicative practices whereas apes don‟t. What is „intersubjective recognition‟? Not synonymous with „identification’ of objects numerically, qualitatively or generically. Not synonymous with ‘acknowledgement’ or acceptance of norms, duties, responsibilities etc. But: practical attitude towards another subject that affirms its/her intentionality, and thereby modifies the recognizer‟s motivational set. Two attitudes of recognition, i.e. two forms of intrinsic motivational altruism Intersubjective recognition in the relevant sense has two types – the axiological and the deontological. Both are ways of being moved by the other subject without „further‟ (instrumental or prudential) reasons, i.e. they are forms of intrinsic motivational altruism. (Ikäheimo 2010a, Ikäheimo 2010b) The axiological form: being intrinsically, i.e. non- instrumentally or non-prudentially, motivated by the needs of the other, or taking the other‟s well-being as intrinsically important. The deontological form: being intrinsically motivated by the will of the other, or taking the other as having intrinsic authority on one. Recognition-theory thus introduces a two- dimensional conception of intrinsic motivational altruism. Pre-linguistic „pointing‟ as Gricean communication According to Tomasello and his group normal human infants at 9-12 months start pointing objects to others and understanding others pointing objects to them. (Tomasello 2006) Genuine communicative pointing is a Gricean communicative act in which subject A tries to communicate something to subject B about an object C, while simultaneously making it overt to B that this is what she is trying to do. It is a way of intentionally creating joint and jointly controllable object-relation. Pointing and altruism Two of the forms of infant communicative pointing have to do with helping and, thus, with “altruism”. (Tomasello 2008, 83-8) Requesting: the infant points an object to the adult so that the adult would give it to the infant. Informing: the infant points an object to the adult with the expectation that it is interesting or useful to the adult. Tomasello suggests that a major factor explaining why (at least) these forms of pointing emerge “naturally” in human infants, where as they don‟t emerge (almost) at all in apes is this: human infants are congenital altruists, whereas the altruistic tendencies of apes are at best very weak. (Tomasello 2009, 1-47) Pointing informatively involves altruism towards the addressee, and pointing requestively involves an expectation of altruism in the addressee. But what sense of „altruism‟ is at stake? We need to distinguish between behavioural and motivational (or „psychological‟) altruism. Behavioural altruism is behaviour that is beneficial to some others, regardless of the motive. Motivational altruism is motivation to behave in ways that are beneficial to some others (and costly to oneself). On Tomasello‟s view human infants have strong innate tendency to motivational altruism. Further, we need to distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic motivational altruism. Instrumental motivational altruism is motivation to benefit another or others, on the condition that one gets thereby rewards that outweigh the costs. Intrinsic motivational altruism is motivation to benefit another or others, without regard for rewards. Tomasello suggest that infants are congenitally intrinsic motivational altruists, and that concern for rewards comes later. Question But wouldn‟t instrumental motivational altruism get practices of communicative pointing that involve helping off the ground? Proposal Strong tendency for intrinsic altruism and for expecting intrinsic motivational altruism in others unburdens interaction from cognitive demands essential to instrumental motivational altruism. Communicative pointing is a cognitively highly demanding intersubjective practice (involving recursive mind-reading etc.). A constant need to calculate possible rewards as well as the others‟ expectations for rewards may not leave enough cognitive resources for the extra operations needed for understanding intentions to communicate by pointing. Thus: apes may have tendencies for instrumental altruism, but they would need either better cognitive capacities, or cognitive unburdening through intrinsic altruism to grasp communicative pointing. Human infants have at least the latter advantage, and perhaps this is decisive for why humans point but apes don‟t. Communicatively requesting vs. non-communicatively ordering Tomasello opposes requesting by pointing as a genuinely (Gricean) communicative act of “informing the adult of one‟s desire”, with “ordering” the other as a mere attempt to influence the other‟s mind causally. Problem But this does not seem right. Clearly ordering can also be a genuinely communicative act. An alternative proposal : two forms of requestive communicative pointing There are two forms of requesting by pointing as a genuinely communicative act. Let us call them „appeal‟ and „command‟. In pointing an object requestively in the appealing mode the message is: “please give it to me”. In pointing an object requestively in the commanding mode the message is: “I want you to give it to me”. Appealing request is informing the addressee of one‟s need, whereas commanding request is informing the addressee of one‟s will. Further proposal : distinct forms of intrinsic motivational altruism correspond to the distinct forms of requestive pointing The axiological form of intrinsic motivational altruism, i.e. being intrinsically motivated by the needs of the other, makes requestive pointing in the appealing mode possible. The addressee is likely to help, because (s)he is motivated by the perceived need of the other. The deontological form of intrinsic motivational altruism, i.e. being intrinsically motivated by the will of the other, makes requestive pointing in the commanding mode possible. The addressee is likely to help because (s)he is motivated by the perceived will of the other. Also, the infant‟s motivation for informing the adult by pointing may be of the axiological or deontological kind. Anthropologists and recognition-theorists unite! One obvious point of contact – among many – between Tomasello‟s work and that of recognition- theorists: Tomasello emphasizes that infants participate in administering social norms from very early on and that this involves mutual intersubjective respect for others as co-authorities of norms with oneself. (Tomasello 2009, 36-8, 57-8) In recognition-theory this – mutually respecting the other as having authority on one – is the form of mutual recognition that unites subjects into a “we” of collective norm-administration (Brandom 1999) It has been suggested above that this deontological form of intersubjective recognition – i.e. the deontological form of intrinsic motivational altruism – is at work already in pre-linguistic communicative pointing, as described by Tomasello and his group. (See also Stekeler- Weithofer (forthcoming)) Literature Brandom, Robert (1999), „Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel‟s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel‟s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 2. Hegel, G.W.F (1977 [1807]), Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford UP. Honneth, A. (2008), Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, Oxford UP. H.-C. Schmidt am Busch & C. Zurn (eds.) (2010), The Philosophy of Recognition, Lexington Books. Ikäheimo, H. & Laitinen, A. (eds.) (forthcoming), Recognition and Social Ontology, Brill. Ikäheimo, H. (2010a), „Making the best of what we are – recognition as an ontological and ethical concept‟, in Schmidt am Busch & Zurn (eds.) (2010). Ikäheimo, H. (2010b), „Is „recognition‟ in the sense of intrinsic motivational altruism necessary for pre-linguistic communicative pointing‟, W. Christensen, E. Schier, J. Sutton, eds., ASCS09—Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science. Available in the internet: www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/ikaheimo.html . (An article-length version of the main points of this poster, plus some further points.) Stekeler-Weithofer , P. (forthcoming), „Intuition, understanding and the human form of life‟, in Ikäheimo & Laitinen (eds.) (forthcoming). Tomasello, M. (2006), „Why don‟t apes point?‟, in Enfield, N. E. & Levinson, C. (eds.) Roots of Human Sociality. Berg. Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of Human Communication, MIT Press. Tomasello, M. (2009), Why We Cooperate, MIT Press. Why apes don’t point but humans d Why apes don’t point but humans do? The case for intersubjective recognition (Anerkennung) as intrinsic motivational altruism Heikki Ikäheimo Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, heikki.ikaheimo@mq.edu.au