Winter 2009 375 Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life? In Defense of a Desire-Based Approach Aaron Simmons* Do we do anything wrong to animals simply by ending their lives if it causes them no pain or suffering? According to some, we can do no wrong to animals by killing them because animals do not have an interest in continued life. An attempt to ground an interest in con- tinued life in animals’ desires faces the challenge that animals are supposedly incapable of desiring to live or of having the kinds of long-range desires which could be thwarted by death. Some philosophers argue that death harms animals not because it thwarts their desires, but rather because it forecloses their future opportunities for satisfaction. However, this argument is problematic because (1) it’s unclear that animals’ future opportunities belong to the same continuing selves and (2) it’s unclear why we should think that animals’ future opportunities have value for them. A more promising argument holds that many animals have an interest in continued life insofar as they possess certain enjoyments in life, where animals’ enjoyments are best understood not merely as leeting experiences but rather as dispositional desires which animals continue to possess over time. ฀ * Email: aasimmons@ymail.com. Simmons is an independent researcher in philosophy. His work focuses primarily on the moral standing of animals, the environment, and human life in its different stages. Some of the ideas in this paper appeared in “In Defense of an Animal's Right to Life” (Ph.D. diss., Bowling Green State University, 2006). The author thanks R. G. Frey, Tom Regan, Dave Sobel, Juan Bouzat, and two anonymous referees, Angus Taylor and Gary Varner, for their helpful comments. I. INTRODUCTION Frequently, philosophical discussions about the ethical treatment of animals focus on the pain and suffering that humans inlict on animals, such as through the practices of animal agriculture and experimentation. But suppose that we could raise and slaughter animals for food—or perform lethal experiments on them—in ways which would cause them little, if any, suffering. would we be treating the animals ethically? Do we do anything wrong to animals simply by killing them? Granted, to kill animals may very well cause them to feel pain and to suffer. But suppose that we go out of our way to kill animals without causing them any pain or suffering—do we do something wrong to animals simply by ending their lives? The question raised here can be cast in terms of moral rights. Do animals have a moral right to life—that is, a justiied moral claim or entitlement to have their lives respected by moral agents? To suggest that they do would imply that human beings have a strong moral duty to refrain not only from making animals suffer but also from killing them. what is required in order to have a right to life? One thing which some philoso- phers have thought to be required is having an interest in continued life. That is, one cannot have a right to life unless one possesses some kind of stake in one’s own 375