265 Chapter 15 Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR–SSR Liberia By Josef Teboho Ansorge and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge The peace process interprets the conflicts from their understanding. They are not interpreting the conflict from the grassroots, from the actual happening. . . . They have come and collected those same peo- ple who were bosses over us and refused to go to the grassroots. Most of the guys you see who got the scholarships, DDRR scholarships, some of them did not even shoot gun. —Joshua Milton Blahyi (aka General Butt Naked) Introduction Security matters a great deal, especially to the most vulnerable mem- bers of a society. Yet the measures or processes that can most effectively achieve security are valid points of contention. The Disarmament, Demo- bilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs in Liberia pose rich cases for the delineation of lessons learned as well as the identification of curious contradictions and potential para- doxes in the way these kinds of large-scale, postconflict reconstruction initiatives are designed, implemented, and measured. This chapter is a candid, down-range assessment by two practitioner-scholars who were closely involved with different aspects of the programs. While the DDR– SSR efforts in Liberia could be regarded as a success simply because they have persisted and there has not been a renewed outbreak of violence, at this stage it is safe to surmise that they have consolidated peace and secu- rity as well as contributed to the reconstruction of that country. This chap- ter describes the programs, highlights best practices, and identifies a number of areas for improvement, as well as important lessons and obser- vations relevant to similar efforts in other countries.