Knowledge, Power, and the Cultures of Repatriation April M. Beisaw Paper to be presented at the 2010 Society for American Archaeology Conference Abstract The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act challenges archaeologists to make determinations of cultural affiliation in consultation with Native Americans. To determine affiliation, identity is reduced to a checklist of evidential sources. One loophole is given, expert opinion, but never defined. Archaeologists often rely on culture history and its labels of identity while Native Americans often rely on oral traditions and its identity labels. A case study provides a context for considering the genealogy of knowledge inherent in such a claim and the imbalance of power that may lead to epistemic injustice. Introduction (Slide 1) This paper focuses on the potential for epistemic injustice to occur in the NAGPRA process, based on my experience with a NAGPRA claim in the Northeastern United States. The region in which this case occurred is significant because there are regional preferences when it comes to archaeological method and theory and in the Northeast culture history is still the preferred means of characterizing sites and artifacts. Despite an ever‐growing body of research that declares culture history as a “straightjacket” to understanding the past (c.f. Hart and Brumbach 2003), it is also still used as the primary means of determining cultural affiliation for NAGPRA compliance across the United States. My role in this NAGPRA process was as a research archaeologist who sought the answers to the question of cultural affiliation within the contents of the archaeological site from which the contested remains were recovered. My goal was to remain an objective scientist and to provide data and expert opinion to anyone who requested it. As such, it became very obvious to me that those with a formal seat at the NAGPRA table (representatives of two Native nations and their lawyers and archaeologists from two institutions and their lawyers) were often more concerned with the legal process than with the characteristics of the human remains, grave goods, or the overall site in question. My attempt to remain an objective scientist was constantly challenged by those who expected me to take sides. “Are you for or against repatriation?” “Neither,” I would respond. “I follow rules. NAGPRA is a rule and my job is to abide by it.” I am no longer so naïve. Epistemic Injustice (Slide 2) Fricker defines epistemic injustice as “a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007:1). The potential for epistemic injustices that was apparent to me, as both a participant and an observer included both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Fricker defines testimonial