1 Wojciech Zaluski Chair for Legal Philosophy and Legal Ethics Jagıellonıan University, Krakow, Poland Three Senses of Moral and Legal Normativity 1. Two strategies of analyzing normativity The problem of normativity concerns all types of rules (e.g. moral, legal, linguistic, logical, mathematical). It is justifiable to speak about ‘the problem of normativity’ because it is not clear whether, appearances notwithstanding, really each type of rule has a normative aspect and what it exactly means that a given rule has a normative aspect. One may tackle this problem in two different ways: (1) by separately analyzing particular types of rules and then, once such analysis is completed, moving on to construct a general theory of normativity (strategy ‘bottom-up’), or (2) by first constructing a general theory of normativity and then applying it to particular types of rules (strategy ‘top-down’). The strategy ‘bottom-up’ seems to me more promising for the following two reasons. First, the objects of various types of rules are different (e.g., moral and legal rules regulate human behaviour and logical rules provide schemes of proper reasoning), so it does not seem justifiable to forejudge a limine that one can construct one and interesting theory for all of them. Second, there are controversies as to whether the normativity of morality and law exists, whereas few scholars are sceptical about the existence of the normativity of linguistic, logical and mathematical rules. Thus, choosing the strategy ‘top-down’ would be tantamount to forejudging a controversial question of the very existence of moral and legal normativity. In my analysis – which will be an example of the application of the strategy bottom-up, though without the ambition of constructing a general theory of normativity – I shall be focused on the problem of normativity of morality and law. Two general theses I propose to defend are: that the normativity of morality and law has three different, though interrelated, senses: psychological, behavioural, and normative (strict); that normativity of law in the strict sense does not exist, i.e., is reducible to the normativity of morality.