War, Escalation and Nuclear Deterrence: The Chinese Case I want to thank Rudy for having me here to say a few words today about the Chinese case. My PhD thesis seeks to frame and understand China’s nuclear posture through the lens of its strategic culture. 1. Cut out excess baggage Unfortunately I will not be able to provide you with an ample account of the Chinese case in twenty minutes. Due to the restriction of time, I am going to treat the technical details of China’s military and nuclear capabilities as excess baggage that I will cut out of my presentation. 2. Basic primers For basic primers into these issues, I recommend the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist’s ‘Nuclear Notebook’ on ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces’, the last edition being released in August of last year and also the US DoD’s latest annual report to Congress (pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act) entitled Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, which provides a decent assessment of China’s grand strategy, military doctrine and force modernisation. 3. Sino-Indian nuclear relationship I won’t be able to say very much about the Sino-Indian dimension in regard to both the Indian and Chinese nuclear postures. The truth of the matter is it is Pakistan (and not China) that, clearly, is the primary security referent in India’s nuclear calculus. Yes, there are significant tensions in Sino-Indian strategic relations. However, while China exercises both conventional military and nuclear superiority over India, India is clearly more concerned about the Pakistani threat. This is a function of several factors. (1)One, according to India’s interpretation of the historical record, China is viewed by India as a more responsible and predictable actor. (2)Two, China has publicly articulated a No-First-Use (NFU) policy, which is similar to India’s. Whether or not China’s 1