T o address civil conflict in Africa, the UN Security Council uses many tools, including the imposition of targeted sanctions. These measures—arms embar- goes, restrictions on the trade of key commodities, asset freezes and travel bans—try to constrain those responsi- ble for continuing war and threatening peace. In contrast to more comprehensive UN sanctions, these “targeted” sanctions are designed to affect specific individuals— such as corrupt or militant leaders—and to hinder net- works of illicit activity that sap public resources or arm rebel forces. But mechanisms to monitor compliance with these targeted sanctions, to introduce accountabili- ty, and to support improved state capacity for enforce- ment are often missing or lacking. 1 As a result, systema- tic violations of targeted sanctions persist. AN OVERLOOKED TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION? To enable the international community to better enforce targeted sanctions, the UN organizes Panels of Experts to investigate and report on how sanctions are being vio- lated. These expert groups also identify broader causes of and incentives for noncompliance, and, in select cases, assess other issues such as the socioeco- nomic impact of sanctions regimes. In July 2007, the UN had six active Panels in: Liberia; Côte d’Ivoire; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Sudan; Somalia; and on Al Qaida and the Taliban. The Sanctions Committees of the Security Council support the Panels. After their investigations, each Panel reports to the Security Council, detailing and exposing suspi- cious activities, naming sanctions violators, and recom- mending specific measures to stem the violations. Although the Council has endorsed many of the Panels’ recommendations, progress in implementing them appears slow. This issue brief looks at the role of Panels and their efforts to strengthen the implementation of targeted sanctions in Africa. Panels draw attention to measures for improving that implementation, but also face challenges in carrying out their work. The effectiveness of these Panels, however, could be increased with better integra- tion and support within the UN system, including coop- eration with UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mis- sions. Panels could further enhance efforts to support fragile peace in war-torn societies, since they highlight gaps in capacity for sustaining the rule of law. This issue brief considers these challenges and suggests ways to improve the effectiveness of UN Panels. THE PANEL MECHANISM & ROLES The Security Council created the first Panel-type mecha- nism in 1995 to investigate violations of the UN weapons embargo on Rwanda. 2 The four-member expert team, called the UN Commission of Inquiry, produced a hard-hitting report detailing the role of regional actors in selling weapons to Rwandan rebels. The first formal Panel of Experts, established in 1999, was sent to investigate sanc- tions violations by the Angolan rebel group UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). 3 The Security Council had pro- hibited the sale or supply of all arms to Angola and restricted the supply of petrole- um to select ports under government control. 4 UNITA continued to purchase arms and fuel despite these meas- ures, but the UN did not fully know when, where, and how the sanctions were violated. At the time, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Robert Fowler, was the Chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee, and instrumental in creating the Panel. He led investigations that produced In July 2007, the UN had six active Panels, in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia, and on the Taliban and Al Qaida. TRACKING BAD GUYS,SMALL ARMS, AND ILLICIT TRADE: THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS P ANELS OF EXPERTS Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations ISSUE BRIEF JULY 2007