Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Volume 12, Number 2 (Summer 2005). 22 EXCLUDING DESTRUCTION: TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE LIBERTARIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME JOHN HADLEY University of Sydney jhad@bigpond.com Abstract: In this paper I argue that the potentially environmentally destructive scope of a libertarian property rights regime can be narrowed by applying reasonable limits to those rights. I will claim that excluding the right to destroy from the libertarian property rights bundle is consistent with self- ownership and Robert Nozick‟s interpretation of the Lockean proviso. Introduction When we consider the libertarian criterion for gauging the moral permissibility of actions it is clear there is scope for rampant environmental destruction. If an act is morally permissible simply in virtue of it being the chosen course of action of the moral agent (Narveson 2000, 310), then the interests of the environment, non-human animals or future generations play little or no part in determining the moral legitimacy of the act concerned. 1 Thus, if the last remnants of an ancient rainforest, or the only remaining source of unpolluted water, or the only surviving breeding pair of an endangered species are threatened by a landowner seeking to reap short term capital rewards, then a strict libertarian, whatever their environmental sympathies, would have to concede that the owner is at liberty to do as she please. On this view, one should not interfere when liberty is exercised in destructive ways, nor should there be any moral prohibition on environmentally destructive actions. Destructive acts may be problematic because they cause ructions in one‟s community or family, or may prick one‟s conscience during long dark nights of the soul, but these are inconveniences that some moral agents may be prepared to accept. The acts which precipitate such social isolation or personal admonition are nonetheless morally legitimate because, according to libertarians, at bottom, they were within the scope of the agent‟s liberty. In this paper I will present an argument that will narrow the destructive scope of libertarianism by invoking limits to property rights ultimately gleaned from Locke. I will challenge the interpretation of libertarianism given above by presenting a case for prohibiting the destruction of natural resources on grounds that libertarians committed to the concept of “self-ownership” can readily accept. 2 My strategy is to argue for restricting the application of the right to destroy in the libertarian property rights “bundle” by appealing to core libertarian concepts and principles, most notably a Lockean conception of “self- ownership” and Nozick‟s version of the Lockean proviso. 3 Libertarian provisos acknowledge the moral claims non-owners have in “common goods” such as land and resources. This suggests that ownership of natural resources, even within a generally libertarian