BARTOSZ BROŻEK L EGAL LOGIC . M YTHS AND CHALLENGES 1. Introduction The controversy over the role of logic in legal reasoning dates back to the 19 th Century. The proponents of legal positivism, endorsing the syllogistic structure of legal think- ing, put forward the claim that logic is an essential tool in the legal arsenal. This claim was strongly opposed by scholars belonging to various schools and supporting differ- ing views of the nature of law. Among them, one should mention legal realists, the rep- resentatives of the school of the free law, the Critical Legal Studies Movement, or the proponents of the topic-rhetorical conception of legal reasoning. 14 I believe, however, that in most cases the debates between the proponents and the opponents of using logic in legal discourse were of no real significance; these were rather pseudo-contro- versies, based on a number of false assumptions and misinterpretations. Below, I would like to review the most fundamental misunderstandings and myths surrounding the application of logic in law. They are mostly of a theoretical or me- ta-theoretical character. In the concluding section I shall raise the question of whether a «specifically legal logic» exists. 2. The myth of inadequacy The thesis that all kinds of legal reasoning have a syllogistic (logical) structure is not a descriptive one; if it were so, the thesis would be evidently false, as it is easy to pro- vide examples of arguments utilizing norms which are logically incorrect. To put it differently, the only reasonable way of understanding the claim pertaining to the logi- cal character of legal reasoning is to treat it as normative: it says how legal reasoning should look like. It is only on this reading that the thesis may become the subject for fruitful debate. Thus, a number of objections levelled against the thesis that logic is useful in law miss the target. For example: the proponents of various incarnations of legal realism rejected the so-called formalism for the sole reason that it misrepresented actual legal practice. Meanwhile, there are no grounds for denying the normative character of the logical models of legal reasoning. Logic is usually considered the minimal requirement of rationality. Therefore, one should not attack it on the basis that some people do not follow its precepts; they simply behave irrationally. 15 It must be added, however, that there exist conceptions of rationality which seem, at least prima facie, to reject the usefulness of logic in the sphere of practical reason (including law). Two famous such conceptions are the topic-rhetorical theory of legal reasoning and legal hermeneutics. 16 14 Cf. Stelmach & Brożek [2006: chapter 1]. 15 Cf. B. Brożek [2007: chapter 2]. 16 Cf. Stelmach & Brożek [2006: chapters 4 and 5].