Animals in Buddhism: In Defence of Hierarchical Evaluation Colette Sciberras Recent years have seen copious publications that bring together Buddhism and environmental ethics, and the question regarding the status of animals within the tradition has formed an important part of the inquiry into its green credentials. Often, Buddhism is charged with being anthropocentric, or with involving some other, similar bias towards human interests, and these accusations generally arise due to the hierarchical organisation of living beings within its traditional cosmology. In this paper, I review these charges in light of some basic Buddhist doctrines, and argue that the objections stem from a misapplication of two philosophical assumptions to certain extracts from the Pāli texts. My general claim is that i f we consider Buddha‘s teachings as a whole, there is little to suggest that he recommended discriminatory behaviour towards nonhuman animals. I start by defining anthropocentrism, speciesism, and human chauvinism, and go on to provide a few reasons why such charges have been brought against Buddhism. It will emerge that the objections rest on two key ideas; there is, first, the assumption of a fundamental divide between humans and other animals, and second, a belief in a restrictive moral circle, which, by including certain beings, automatically excludes others. Buddhism, however, does not endorse these ideas, and the charges against it only arise when commentators misappropriate these, or similar, beliefs into their account of the Buddha‘s teachings. The teachings emphasize continuity between living beings, and not difference, and I will argue that despite the fact that Buddhism‘s hierarchical view of life places humans at the summit, there are no