DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00341.x Seeing Empty Space Louise Richardson Abstract: In this paper I offer an account of a particular variety of perception of absence, namely, visual perception of empty space. In so doing, I aim to make explicit the role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin’s account of the visual field. I suggest we should make sense of the claim that vision has a field—in Martin’ss sense—in terms of our being aware of its limitations or boundaries. I argue that the limits of the visual field are our own sensory limitations, and that we are aware of them as such. Seeing empty space, I argue, involves a structural feature of experience that constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory limitations, and thus, in virtue of which vision has a field. Introduction In this paper I offer an account of a particular variety of perception of absence. I argue that we see empty space and describe what this seeing involves. In section 1, I introduce the commonly-made claim that we don’t perceive absences. I argue that seeing empty space provides a counterexample to this claim, and that there is no reason to think that seeing empty space is, as might be suggested, a perception of absence that requires the perceiver to have a cognitive attitude with the content that the relevant absence obtains (sections 2 and 3). In the remaining sections I give my positive account of seeing empty space. In this account, I aim to make explicit the role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin’s account of the visual field. In section 4 I distinguish Martin’s distinctive notion of the visual field from others to be found in the philosophical literature. I suggest we should make sense of the claim that vision has a field—in Martin’s sense—in terms of our being aware of its limitations or boundaries. I argue that the limits of the visual field are our own sensory limitations, and that we are aware of them as such (section 5). Seeing empty space, I argue, involves a structural feature of experience that constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory limitations, and thus, in virtue of which vision has a field (sections 6 and 7). 1. Is Perception ‘Positivity All the Way’? Many philosophers have argued that we don’t perceive absences. Amongst them is Brian O’Shaughnessy. Perception, he claims, is invariably of presences, it is European Journal of Philosophy ]]]:]] ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 1–17 r 2009 The Author. Journal compilation r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.