Social Epistemology Vol. 20, No. 1, January–March 2006, pp. 93–103 ISSN 0269–1728 (print)/ISSN 1464–5297 (online) © 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/02691720500512275 Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief Scott F. Aikin Taylor and Francis Ltd TSEP_A_151210.sgm 10.1080/02691720500512275 Social Epistemology 0269-1728 (print)/1464-5297 (online) Original Article 2006 Taylor & Francis Ltd 20 1 000000January-March 2006 A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion. Keywords: Evidentialism; Belief; Contrastive Statements A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject takes her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the follow- ing, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion. Fred has three friends variously in the dark about whether it will rain tomorrow and what Fred thinks of it. The first friend has heard some conflicting reports about who says it will rain tomorrow. Fred responds that: (1) I, for my part, believe it will rain. Scott F. Aikin is a graduate student at Vanderbilt University. His dissertation is on epistemic foundationalism, and he plans on defending in the Fall of 2005. He has work forthcoming in Philosophical Studies and Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Correspondence to: Scott F. Aikin, Department of Philosophy, 111 Furman Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240, USA. Email: scott.f.aikin@vanderbilt.edu.