CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 2001/43 INCENTIVES AND THE CORE OF AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY: A SURVEY Fran¸ coise Forges 1 , Enrico Minelli 2 and Rajiv Vohra 3 September 2001 Abstract This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive com- patibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. Keywords: Core, Asymmetric Information, Incentive Compatibility, Exchange Economy. JEL Classification: C71, D82, D51. 1 THEMA, Universit´ e de Cergy-Pontoise, et Institut Universitaire de France. THEMA, Universit´ e de Cergy-Pontoise, 33, Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France. E-mail: forges@u-cergy.fr 2 CORE, Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain. CORE, voie du Roman Pays 34, B-1348, Louvain la Neuve, Belgique; minelli@core.ucl.ac.be 3 Brown University. Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, U.S.A.; Rajiv Vohra@brown.edu We thank Serkan Bahceci, Geoffroy de Clippel, Ali Khan, Herakles Polemarchakis, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij for many helpful comments. This text presents re- search results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.