Journal of Cn‘miml Justice Vol. 20. pp. 107-120 (1992) All rights reserved. Printed in U.S.A. 004%2352/w ss.00+ .w ccpight b 1992 Pclgunon Pnss hi. INFERRING THE CRIMINAL MIND: TOWARD A BRIDGE BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING LAURENCE J. SEVERANCE Attorney at Law Seattle, Washington 98 104 JANE GOODMAN and ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS Department of Psychology University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98 195 ABSTRACT Criminal law is concerned with defining when people commit prohibited acts accompanied by cul- pable mental states (criminal intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence). An experiment focused on how laypeople, asked to serve as “‘jurors,” interpret and apply legal instructions on the definitions of culpable mental states. The results pinpoint differences between legal mental state definitions that jurors are expected to apply in deciding criminal cases and laypersons’ understanding of those mental states. Laypeople do not comprehend mental state distinctions that are difSerentiated in legal doctrine. The results are discussed in terms of attribution theory, and practical suggestions are made that may be useful to attorneys. In virtually all United States jurisdictions, or “willful act.” In order to convict a defen- criminal statutes require proof of two types dant, the Sixth Amendment to the United of elements: (1) specified culpable mental States Constitution and the standards set forth states, for example, criminal “intent” or by the United States Supreme Court in In t-e “recklessness,” and (2) overt behavioral acts, Winship (1970) require each element of an for example, an “unauthorized entry into a alleged crime, both a mental state element and building” or “taking a car without permis- a behavioral element, to be proved beyond a sion.” The mental state element is referred to reasonable doubt. Culpable mental states un- as mens rea or “guilty mind,” while the be- accompanied by the requisite behavioral acts havioral component is referred to as actus reus do not constitute crimes. Similarly, culpable 107