Pergamon Person. individ. Difl Vol. 17. No. I. pp. 35-48. 1994 Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd 0191-8869(94)EOO24-L Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191.8869/ 94 $7.00 +O.oO THEORIES OF CRIME, ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT AND JUROR BIAS AMONGST POLICE, OFFENDERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC ADRIAN FURNHAM and LAURENCE ALISON Department of Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1 OAP, England (Received 9 October 1993) Summary-A questionnaire was constructed to investigate theories of criminality, pre-trial juror bias and attitudes towards punishment amongst three groups: police officers, a sample of the general public and a group of offenders. It was anticipated that police would be prosecutor biased, advocate harsher sentences for criminal acts and be inclined to view crime as a deviation from a socially acceptable norm-a ‘consensus’ view. In contrast, offenders were expected to show a defence bias, be more lenient in their sentencing and hold a ‘conflict’ ideology, i.e. view criminals as victims of circumstance. The general public group were expected to show less extreme responses on any of the purported dimensions. All hypotheses were supported, and the relative importance of both of these potentially influencing factors is discussed. INTRODUCTION Simplistic ideological theories of crime are not new-in social and historical terms they have been present in the criminological literature in the form of classical, positivist, and radical criminological theories. The first two adhere to what is labelled the ‘consensus’ view of crime whilst the third can be categorized as a ‘conflict’ view. These conceptual philosophies are similar in kind to the same simplistic ideologies that most people subscribe to in surveys on crime. In its most basic terms the consensus view incorporates both classical and positivist theories of crime (Hollin, 1989). This view suggests that society functions as an integrated structure and that a criminal act can be defined as some action which upsets consensus agreement. A crime, therefore, necessarily meets with the disapproval of the majority. Conflict ideology has its roots in Marxist philosophy. Theorists such as Willem Bonger (cited in Hollin, 1989) began to formulate a full Marxist view of crime, asserting that no act is naturally immoral, but that ‘crimes’ are ubiquitous in all walks of life and represent normal reactions to circumstances. The theory proposes that since the rich control the regulation of crime, they design the system to suit their own purposes. This explains, according to the radical criminologist, some of the illogical differences in what does and what does not constitute criminal activity. For example, whilst a robber is commonly considered a more prototypic example of the criminal type, a business man involved in a large scale fraud is not. Similarly, unjustified claims to welfare benefits lead to more prosecutions than deliberate tax evasions, although the latter cause a greater loss of revenue (Hollin, 1989). Since individuals of higher status are more likely to be the law makers, conflict ideologists argue the system is designed to suit their circumstances. ‘Consensus’ and ‘conflict’ are labels that have come from the criminological literature and describe two quite different theories of crime and criminality. The same labels can be used to categorize individuals’ responses to surveys on crime indicating, that in general, crude interpretations of crime are held by most people (Eysenck, 1954). However, it remains unclear, (a) which variables influence these quite different perspectives and (b) whether a consensus or conflict viewpoint correlates with a particular attitude to punishment and/or a bias in judgement (i.e. a greater willingness to prosecute or defend, given only neutral evidence). A second important variable influencing one’s attitude to crime and punishment is likely to be one’s experience of crime. This could take any of the following forms: Oj%wders, with direct involvement with ‘committing crime’; victims of crime; professionals who have experience with offenders-in any of the following capacities: (a) penal/judiciary, (b) detention, apprehension and interrogation and (c) rehabilitation and treatment. Presumably those different experiences of crime shape one’s perception not only of the causes but the most effective and just punishment of criminals. 35