5 Negotiating Privacy across Arenas: The EU-US "Safe Harbor" Discussions Henry Farrell Much recent theoretical attention has been devoted to the provision of common goods across arenas. The normal problems of common good provision (Olson 1968; Hardin 1982) are exacerbated when these problems spill across arenas (there are usually no actors capable of imposing hierarchical solutions), but there are also new difficulties. Solutions in one particular arena of policy-making may be incompatible with the solution or broader regulatory mechanisms in another arena. Furthermore, states, which may solve some common goods problems seem to be losing some decision making competencies in the global arena. While non-state actors may provide at least some common goods (Ronit and Schneider 1999), it is unlikely that these forms of provision can be generalized in any meaningful way. Many authors believe that globalization makes it vastly more difficult to solve international common good problems (Cerny 1995). Yet this pessimism may at least be partly misplaced. The globalization lit- erature argues both that common problems spill over state borders ever more (common good difficulties are internationalized) and that the capacity of states to respond to these problems is ever weaker (there is insufficient capacity to provide common goods internationally). While the first of these claims is true in many areas, the second is at least arguable. States may still try to solve collec- tive action problems through unilateral action, through coordination among themselves, and through new forms of policy which mix public and private ac- tion. The second and third of these types of solution typically require negotia- tions which seek to harmonize forms of common good provision across arenas, or at least to ensure the compatibility of different solutions in different arenas. This layer of international negotiation provides new opportunities for actors in domestic arenas. The third kind of solution – public actors working together with private actors, or indeed delegating substantial enforcement authority to them – has at- tracted much recent attention. On the one hand, advocates of this approach (es- pecially in business and government) suggest that it allows a much greater de- gree of flexibility than “traditional” regulation. On the other hand, critics (who 101