Why and How Do Political Actors Do Risky Reforms? A Theoretical Account Rooted in Prospect Theory and the Theory of Blame Avoidance * Barbara Vis and Kees van Kersbergen Department of Political Science Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam De Boelelaan 1081 NL-1081HV Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel + 31 20 598 6821 Email: B.Vis@fsw.vu.nl June 2005 Word count: 8.552 (including references and endnotes) * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop “Blame Avoidance and Blame Management: Institutional and Policy Implications” of the ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, Spain, April 14–19, 2005. We wish to thank the participants for their useful remarks. We also would like to thank Catherine Netjes and Sabina Stiller for their comments.