Two Takes on the De Se* Marina Folescu and James Higginbotham University of Southern California 1. Background In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including the contents of imagination and memory, and extending to objects of fear, enjoyment, and other emotions directed toward worldly happenings, may be distinctively first-personal, or "de se," to use the terminology introduced in Lewis (1979), and exhibit the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (hereafter: IEM) in the sense of Shoemaker (1968) and elsewhere. Higginbotham (2003) and (2010) had emphasized the sense in which IEM could be said to arise from cross-reference; that is, from thinking of oneself as the subject of that very thought (with limitations, as surveyed also in those papers). It was noted, rather by the way, that there were contexts of thought where neither oneself nor anything else was given in the role of (say) the experiencer of a content of imagination; but we now think that these contexts support a distinct conception of IEM, one that in a sense is sympathetic to Anscombe (1975). Finally, there is a question of IEM in contexts where one is given, not as experiencer, but in some other role, a question that was unaddressed in the earlier work cited. The different dimensions of the de se, we will argue, come apart in the following sense: some first-personal propositions, memories, and fears are about oneself as an experiencer of the contents in question, and others not; and some that are about the experiencer are not given as about oneself. Both of these have figured in the extensive literature on the de se, but in different ways, as noted below. Their clear separation, on the one hand, and their intimate connection in