Mental Institutions Shaun Gallagher Æ Anthony Crisafi Published online: 20 December 2008 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008 Abstract We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on ‘‘objective spirit’’ which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental pro- cesses. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior. Keywords Extended mind Á Objective spirit Á Parity principle Á Hegel Á Social institutions 1 Introduction It may seem philosophically odd to offer a corrective to an overly Cartesian cognitive science by turning to Hegel—a philosopher who is rarely mentioned in contemporary discussions of the philosophy and science of mind. Indeed, to anyone familiar with Hegel, to mention Hegel in the context of philosophy of mind and cognitive science will likely evoke an embodied reaction, or at the very least a knee-jerk response. Can Hegel really offer anything pro- ductive to ongoing debates in these areas? Our intention, however, is not to propose Hegel as a new general philo- sophical consultant for the cognitive sciences. Rather we see him as a resource that can be used on a limited basis, and specifically, here, in regard to the question of the extended mind. Let that be the first proviso. The second one is that the Hegel we appeal to will strike anyone familiar with Hegel as somewhat anemic—not the full- blooded Hegel that insists on the strict dialectic or the large and overarching concept of Spirit. We’ll leave that Hegel for the few Hegelians who have survived. Rather, with apologies to those Hegelians, we appeal to only one par- ticular aspect of Hegel’s work, and we frame it in ways that Hegel might not approve. In the history of the use and abuse of Hegel, however, this is nothing new, and in any case, this is not a paper about Hegel; it is about what we can learn from Hegel that may be relevant to the concept of the extended mind. 2 Beyond the Parity Principle By introducing the concept of extended mind, Clark and Chalmers (1998) were clearly trying to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is something that happens in a private mental space, or in the head. The concept of the extended mind is a challenge to this idea. At the same time, the parity principle, which is central to their argument, although presented as liberating the way we S. Gallagher (&) Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences and IST, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA e-mail: gallaghr@mail.ucf.edu S. Gallagher Á A. Crisafi Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, England, UK A. Crisafi Philosophy and Humanities, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA 123 Topoi (2009) 28:45–51 DOI 10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0