The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Advances Volume 12, Issue 1 2012 Article 23 Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts Emanuele Gerratana ∗ Levent Koc¸kesen † * SIPA, Columbia University, eg198@columbia.edu † Koc¸ University, lkockesen@ku.edu.tr Recommended Citation Emanuele Gerratana and Levent Koc¸kesen (2012) “Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 12: Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 23. DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.23 Copyright c 2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved. Brought to you by | Columbia University Library The Burke Library New York (Columbia University Library The Burke Library New York) Authenticated | 172.16.1.226