Person-Organization Fit in Contests: Experimental Evidence ∗ Ola Andersson † Marieke Huysentruyt ‡ Topi Miettinen § Ute Stephan ¶ March 1, 2012 [Preliminary version, please do not circulate or cite] Abstract This paper studies the interaction of organizational culture and personal prosocial orien- tation in a competing teams contest. In a computerized lab experiment subjects are assigned to one of two alternative primed organizational cultures emphasizing either self-enhancement or self-transcendence. Individual effort under these cultures is compared to the performance under a neutrally primed benchline condition. Prosocially oriented subjects exert more, and proself oriented subjects exert less, effort in the self-transcendent, prosocial, culture condi- tion. Nevertheless, self-enhancement culture has no impact on the performance of either personality type under team incentives. This evidence is the first causal test of person- organization fit theory. In an auxiliary experiment we also conduct an experiment with competing individuals contest and and find that the link between prosocial individuals and the corresponding culture condition vanishes. These findings extend person-organization fit theory by pointing to the importance of a ’triple-fit’ of preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanism for those prosocially oriented. JEL: tournaments; organizational culture; personal values; person-organization fit; teams; economic incentives Keywords: C91, D23, J33, M52 ∗ We thank Michael Kosfeld, Chloe Le Coq, Werner G¨ uth, Andrew Schotter and seminar participants at Copenhagen University, at the 4th Nordic Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, and at the ESA World Congress 2010 for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena for hospitality. The research leading to these results has received funding from the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation and from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2011 under grant agreement 217622 (see Article II.30. of the Grant Agreement). Ola Andersson also thanks the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation for financial support. Christoph G¨oring provided excellent research assistance. † Research Institute of Industrial Economics; ola.andersson@ifn.se ‡ London School of Economics & SITE at Stockholm School of Economics; m.e.huysentruyt@lse.ac.uk § Hanken School of Economics at HECER & SITE at Stockholm School of Economics; topi.miettinen@hanken.fi ¶ University of Sheffield; u.stephan@sheffield.ac.uk 1