10 Policy Focus #53 PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT Mahmoud Abbas’s strategy of integrating Hamas into the Palestinian political system backired with Hamas’s sweeping elec- toral victory in the legislative elections. Abbas had hoped that Hamas, as a minority party in the Palestin- ian Legislative Council (PLC), could be tamed by its acceptance of the rules that it had consistently louted since rejecting the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA); he thought he could disarm Hamas through democratic means. But with Hamas’s winning majority control of the PLC, a chance no longer exists to dictate terms to it. Already, Hamas’s leaders have said they will not compromise their core principles, even if it means a cutof of international aid to the PA. Khaled Mashal, the Damascus-based chief of Hamas’s political bureau, announced: “Hamas will manage and the Arab coun- tries and Muslims won’t let the Palestinians down. Hamas will not trade its political program for money from the international community.” In this context, it is important to understand what Hamas’s political pro- gram will be, including its domestic priorities, interna- tional policies, and strategy toward Israel. Hamas’s Strategy toward Israel In a January 29 press conference broadcast on al- Jazeera, Mashal said Hamas is willing to negotiate a long-term truce, or hudna, with Israel in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, cre- ation of linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, and release of all Palestinian prisoners. Mashal, however, suggested that the door would remain open when he said, “When Israel proposes a genuine offer, we will look into it, but right now there is nothing on the table to discuss.” As for the Quartet’s Roadmap to Peace, Mashal denounced it as “Sharon’s map, and Hamas will never accept it.” Hamas thus wants to replace the con- cept of a comprehensive peace agreement based on the idea of mutual recognition and a two-state solution in inalized borders with a long-term, indeinite cessation of hostilities. Understanding the Hamas Agenda By Mohammed Yaghi Hamas’s rejection of a two-state solution and its preference for a long-term truce stem from three fac- tors. First, Hamas’s Islamic ideology believes that any part of the Muslim land is an Islamic endowment, or waqf, and no Muslim has the right to give up owner- ship of the land. Historic Palestine is an especially signiicant waqf in as much as it contains the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem—the first Kiblah, or object of Muslim prayers. Second, Hamas’s religious connection to the land coincides with its role in the wider Muslim Brother- hood movement, which values the essential impor- tance of establishing Islamic regimes throughout the region as prerequisite to liberating historic Palestine. Recognizing Israel’s right to exist is thus anathema to Hamas’s Islamic identity and its identity within the Muslim Brotherhood. Third, Hamas also derives the concept of hudna from Muslim tradition, where the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad teaches that seeking a truce with enemies is legitimate as a practical measure when- ever Muslims are not in a position either to conquer their foes or to impose their demands on them. he Prophet himself arranged such a truce with his rivals in Mecca before conquering them two years later after they violated the agreement. For Hamas, the hudna represents an opportunity to rest and rebuild. A truce is not, by any means, a inal resolution of the conlict, unlike the “end of conlict” agreement envis- aged in both the Oslo process and the roadmap. For now, Hamas says it will respect existing agreements between the PA and Israel, but this approach is lim- ited only to resolving issues of daily life rather than applied to forging a longer-term peace. Hamas’s long-term intentions can also be gleaned from its desire to join a “wider resistance front com- prised of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah,” according to Mashal, and its refusal to consider disarming its Izz al- Din al-Qassam Brigades. A more formal alliance with Iran and Hizballah, which could include increased Iranian inancial support of a Hamas-controlled PA,