PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 17, NO. 1, 2004 After objectivity: an empirical study of moral judgment Shaun NicholsDepartment of PhilosophyCollege of CharlestonCharlestonSC 29424USAnichols@cofc.edu SHAUN NICHOLS ABSTRACT This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conven- tional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity. Were I not afraid of appearing too philosophical, I should remind my reader of that famous doctrine, supposed to be fully proved in modern times, “That tastes and colors, and all other sensible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but merely in the senses.” The case is the same with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice … And as it is certain, that the discovery above-mentioned in natural philosophy, makes no alteration on action and conduct; why should a like discovery in moral philosophy make any alteration? (Hume, 1742/1987, p. 166) 1. Introduction If we become convinced that morality lacks objective moorings, what will the consequences be for our commonsense moral judgment? Would a rejection of moral objectivism engender rampant nihilism? Or would the rejection of moral objectivism leave our normative lives relatively unfazed? Even at a popular level, these questions have real currency. People worry that the abandonment of moral objectivity threat- ens to unravel the moral tissue of society. Meanwhile, professional philosophers debate the implications of nonobjectivism for the status of commonsense moral claims. “Error theorists” maintain that commonsense is mistakenly committed to the view that morality is objective and that, as a consequence, lay moral concepts are Shaun Nichols, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC 29424 USA, email: nichols@cofc.edu ISSN 0951-5089/print/ISSN 1465-394X/online/04/010000–00  2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0951508042000202354